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ABSTRACT 
 This research examines paid military service in Turkey utilizing the Population 
Representation Model introduced originally by M. J. Eitelberg in 1979. Despite the 
worldwide trend toward professional militaries, Turkey is one of few countries that relies 
on a universal draft for its military manpower. Every year, thousands of young men are 
enlisted for six to twelve months; however, eligible men have the option to purchase a 
paid exemption from compulsory military service. The most recent paid military service 
exemption law was introduced in August 2018 and requires a fee of $2,700. Because 
many diverse governments in Turkey have introduced military buy-out laws, it can be 
argued that this exemption practice is seen as legitimate in the country. On the other 
hand, in terms of social equity, the exemption laws may be changing the composition of 
the Turkish military by underrepresenting certain segments of Turkish society within the 
force. While paid exemption laws can help to increase the proportion of professional 
members and ultimately strengthen the effectiveness of the Turkish military, recent 
exemption laws have created a historically large gap in the draftee corps. Therefore, it 
might be better if Turkey stops offering the option of paid exemption based on temporary 
laws. If there is an excess of young men in the population, the exemption laws could be 
revised and applied permanently to uphold the principle of “equality before the law.” 
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This thesis evaluates paid military service, a policy that allows some men to 
purchase an exemption from the draft in Turkey, using a Population Representation Model. 
The framework is to evaluate the policy in terms of social equity, political legitimacy, and 
military effectiveness. Additionally, the study will assess the policy using cost-benefit 
analysis. The research also includes a detailed examination of the social implications of the 
policy in Turkey, focusing on relations between the Turkish military and society.  
B. METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
The research uses both a quantitative and qualitative approach. The following 
research questions are addressed to refine the thesis statement.  
Primary Research Question: 
Should the Turkish government offer the option of paying a certain fee to be exempt 
from compulsory military service? 
Secondary Research Questions: 
1. Is paid military service an effective method for staffing the Turkish 
military and meeting the nation’s defense needs?  
2. Is paid military service fair? 
3. Does paid military service follow the established principles of Turkey’s 
constitutional government, and does it have popular approval? 
C. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is comprised of six chapters. Following the introductory chapter, 
Chapter II provides background information and a brief literature review relating to paid 
military service exemptions in Turkey. Chapter III examines recent developments in 
Turkey within the scope of the research. Chapter IV focuses on the social and economic 
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implications of paid military service. Chapter V evaluates paid military service exemptions 
in Turkey utilizing the “Population Representation Model” to address the research 
questions. Finally, Chapter VI summarizes the study and provides conclusions and 
recommendations for further research. 
Chapter II explains the institutional settings, history, procurement ways, and 
service types of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). General principles and a description of 
the Turkish Universal Draft are discussed to gain a better insight for the evaluation. The 
second part of this chapter reviews the literature surrounding the development of the paid 
military service exemptions in Turkey. 
Chapter III examines recent developments that shape or show public attitudes 
toward the military in Turkey. First, the chapter reviews the attempted military coup on 
July 15, 2016, and the aftereffects of this unfortunate event. The chapter then presents a 
brief assessment of the long-lasting, agonizing conflict with the Kurdish Separatist 
Terrorist Group called PKK. Finally, Turkey’s most recent paid military service exemption 
law is described and explained. 
Chapter IV seeks to understand the social and economic relationship of the TAF 
and the Turkish nation. The first part of the chapter looks at the TAF’s strong bond with 
the nation and why the Turkish people view the TAF as the most trustworthy institution in 
the country. The second part of the chapter assesses the shrinking budgets of the TAF 
allotted by the nation and the economic cost of the universal draft. 
Chapter V evaluates the paid military service exemption in Turkey utilizing the 
“Population Representation Model” (PRM) introduced originally by Eitelberg (1979). 
Following the PRM, the chapter examines paid military service exemptions in terms of 
three major factors: political legitimacy, social equity, and military effectiveness.  
Chapter VI summarizes the study, provides a conclusion, and refines the thesis 
statement. Finally, it offers recommendations for further research. 
3 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter I introduced the purpose, analysis method, and the structure of the thesis. 
This chapter reviews the background and literature relating to the development of paid 
military service exemptions in Turkey. The chapter is divided into two sections, first the 
background, then the literature review, which focuses more directly on Turkey’s paid 
military service exemption.  
A. BACKGROUND  
The institutional settings, history, manpower procurement methods, and service 
types of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) are explained in this section. This includes a 
discussion of general principles and a brief description of the Turkish Universal Draft. 
Finally, the section looks at applications of paid military exemptions based on temporary 
laws enacted several times after the 1980s. 
1. Structure of the Turkish Military 
a. General 
The origin of the TAF dates back to 209 BC, when Modu Chanyu (Metehan) 
integrated nomadic Turkic warrior bands to form a permanent force (Turhal, 2006). He 
introduced a new structure with a modern sense of chain of command, which had ten-
soldier teams as the smallest fighting unit and ten-thousand-soldier divisions (tumen) as 
the largest fighting unit. The official emblem of the Turkish Army, as shown in Figure 1, 
provides a good illustration of positive public opinions toward the military, the military’s 
strong connection with national history, and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s enduring, 








(accessed October 21, 2016). 
Figure 1. Official emblem of the Turkish Army (Turkish Land Forces) 
Each element of the Turkish Army emblem is symbolic within the frame of modern 
Turkish history and in defining the military’s place in defending the nation (Demirkan, 
2005). These include: 
• Four big stars:  Represent the command level of the Turkish Army. 
• Bordeaux background featuring star and crescent: Represent that the 
Turkish Army is in the Turkish nation’s service. 
• Wreath with sword and oak leaf: Represent a determined and powerful 
Turkish Army. 
• Ataturk’s silhouette:  Shows the founder of the modern Turkish Republic, 
Ataturk, commanding in the Battle of Dumlupinar. 
• Bay leaves:  Represent Ataturk’s policy of “peace at home, peace in the 
world.” 
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• Sixteen small stars: Represent the sixteen Turkish states that existed 
before the Republic of Turkey and throughout its history. (Demirkan, 
2005)  
• M.Ö.209: Means 209 BC and the foundation date of the Turkish Army. 
The legacy of Metehan’s ancient steppe warriors carried down through Turkish 
history. As a result of maintaining this standing military tradition of several millenia, the 
modern-day TAF is using a similar structure and ranks as Metehan’s. Therefore, the 
Turkish Army celebrated its 2225th anniversary in June 2016 (Turkish Army, n.d.).  
The TAF has three major branches subordinate to the Turkish General Staff: Army, 
Navy, and Air Forces. Along with these forces, the Coast Guard and the Gendarmerie, 
which are subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in peacetime, also have military 
capabilities. In wartime, the Coast Guard and the Gendarmerie are subordinate to the Navy 
and Army Commands. 
The TAF is empowered by the Turkish Constitution, and the overall head is the 
President of Turkey. The mission of the TAF, according to the Constitution (1982), is  
to defend Turkey against risks and threats from abroad, preserve efficient 
and adequate deterrence capabilities by reinforcing military power, and 
execute the missions in abroad as per the Turkish Parliament’s decision and 
support international peace. (p. 23) 
b. Manpower and Procurement 
According to World Bank Data (n.d.), the TAF has experienced a three-percent 
decrease in personnel over the past three decades; however, the Turkish military still ranks 
second in size among NATO countries and fourteenth in the world in terms of “ready-to-
fight” elements (Global Fire Power, n.d.). The longstanding presence and extent of threats 
to national security require that Turkey employ such a substantial active military force.  
Due to its strategic position across Europe, particularly the Balkans, the Middle 
East, and the former Soviet Union, Turkey is at the crossroads of world affairs (Blank, 
Pelletiere, & Johnsen, 1993). Various social, economic, and political implications result 
from Turkey’s geostrategic and geopolitical position in these regions. Nevertheless, as an 
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inevitable consequence of being neighbors to war-torn regions with massive and enduring 
power-vacuums and numerous terrorist groups, “the magnitude of threats to Turkey’s 
integrity is great, [and consequently] the Turkish military has to employ a vast number of 
people” (Engin, 2016, p. 11). 
Three types of active-duty personnel are in the Turkish military branches. These 
include: 
(1) Commissioned Officers 
Regardless of some minor changes through the years, the TAF Personnel Act of 
1967 regulates the rights, responsibilities, and procedures of commissioned officers. No 
lateral entry is allowed in the officer corps, and every new officer is commissioned at the 
rank of second lieutenant. New officers can be commissioned in one of the following two 
ways: 
(a) Graduation from Service Academy: The Army Military Academy, Air Force 
Academy and Naval Academy are the main source for their corresponding service 
commands. Gendarmerie officers receive their commission in the Army Military 
Academy; likewise, Coast Guard officers can receive their commission in the Naval 
Academy (The TAF Personnel Act, 1967). Service academies provide a four-year 
education and two diplomas, engineering and officership. Upon graduation, every year on 
August 30, cadets join officer troops as a second lieutenant in their respective branch.  
(b) Accession through contract: Being a four-year university graduate not older 
than 27 is the first criterion for applying to serve as a contracting officer. Further screening 
consists of written and verbal exams, medical test, and criminal record check (The 
Contracting Personnel Act, 2001). Eligible candidates are required to complete a basic 
military training program that includes boot camp and essential military disciplines. 
(2) Non-commissioned Officers 
Similar to commissioned officers, new non-commissioned officers can be 
appointed in one of the following two ways:  
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(a) Graduation from non-commissioned officer schools: These schools serve as 
the primary sources to fill non-commissioned officer billets. The first criterion for 
acceptance to these schools is being a high school or upper-level graduate who is not older 
than 21. Non-commissioned officer schools grant two-year technical education and, upon 
graduation, cadets start to serve as staff sergeants in respective branches of the TAF (The 
TAF Personnel Act, 1967). 
(b) Accession through contract: Being a two- or four-year university graduate 
not older than 27 is the first criterion for applying to serve as a contracting non-
commissioned officer. Further screening consists of written and verbal exams, medical test, 
and criminal record check (The Contracting Personnel Act, 2001). Eligible candidates are 
required to complete a basic military training program that includes boot camp and 
essential military disciplines. 
(3) Specialists and Privates 
Despite the worldwide trend toward professional or all-volunteer armies, Turkey 
still relies on a universal draft for its manpower needs. Thousands of young male citizens 
are called for military service in batches at the age of 20. Some deferments are available, 
such as for higher education or occupational training programs, but all male citizens from 
20 to 41 are ultimately required to serve for twelve months or for six months, if the draftee 
is holding a four-year university or further degree (The Turkish Recruitment Act, 1927). 
In a move toward creating more long-term continuity within the ranks, Turkey introduced 
the contracting private act in 2011 to man its critical billets (The Contracting Private Act, 
2011). 
Specialists have filled critical billets in the TAF since 1986. (See Table 1 for the 
number of specialists as of May 2016.) Holding the same status as privates, specialists are 
deemed more professional and have a more active role against the fight with the Kurdish 
Terrorist Group (PKK) in the southeastern part of Turkey. After completing their 
compulsory service, individuals who were conscripted can remain in the TAF as 
specialists. (The Specialist Act, 1986). 
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c. Manpower in Numbers 
Manpower data presented here can be found on the website of the TAF. However, 
available data are not presented by TAF in terms of separate services; thus, Army, Navy, 
and Air Force data are combined in Tables 1 through 3. Table 1 shows the number of 
professionals in the TAF. Even with its relatively lean professional active-force 
component, Turkey ranks 24th in the world and has more personnel than in the total active-
duty forces of some European states, such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom 
(Global Fire Power, n.d.). 
Table 1 shows the professional components of the TAF. Professional components 
basically include the career-oriented personnel of the TAF who work on a salary basis. 
Table 1. Number of professionals in TAF, May 2016 
Status Army, Navy, 
Air Force 
Gendarmerie Coast Guard Total 
Commissioned officer 32,545 6,502 664 39,711 
Non-com. Officer 69,014 47,605 1,571 118,190 
Specialist 46,719 26,343 654 73,716 
Contracting Private 11,412 - 135 11,547 
Total 159,690 80,450 3,024 243,164 
Adapted from http://www.tsk.tr/3_basin_yayin_faaliyetleri/3_4_tskdan_haberler/2015/tsk_haberler_ 
34.html. Accessed October 25, 2016. 
 
Table 2 shows the non-professional component of the TAF. It should be noted that 
Third Lieutenants are chosen from among four-year university graduates and consist of 
nearly two percent of non-professionals. 
Table 2. Number of non-professionals in TAF, May 2016 





3rd Lt.(Reserve Officer) 6,245 827 15 7,087 
Private/Corporal/Sergeant 210,978 98,365 1,530 311,245 
Total 217,223 99,192 1,917 318,332 
Adapted from http://www.sozlesmelierler.net. Accessed October 27, 2016. 
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Table 3 merely combines the total numbers from Tables 1 and 2 to facilitate easier 
comparison. As seen in Table 3, professionals constitute approximately 42 to 45 percent of 
the combined Army/Navy/Air Force, the Gendarmerie, and the total TAF. In the much 
smaller Coast Guard, professionals account for 61 percent of the total. 
Table 3. Total personnel strength in TAF, May 2016 
Status Army, Navy, 
Air Force 
Gendarmerie Coast Guard Total 
Professionals 159,690 80,450 3,024 243,164 
Non-professionals 217,223 99,192 1,917 318,332 
Total 376,913 179,642 4,941 561,496 
Calculated using data from Tables 1 and 2. 
 
2. The Draft System in Turkey 
a. General Principles 
To raise the necessary military force that will defend the Turkish nation, a universal 
draft was first introduced in 1916 during an era in which Turkish troops fought in several 
battles (Gallipoli, Caucasia, Yemen, Iraq, Iran, Balkans, etc.). Even though there is a global 
trend toward professional armies, the TAF still relies on a universal draft to meet its 
personnel needs. Article 72 of the Constitution (1982) defines the duties of its citizens as:  
National service is the right and duty of every Turk. The manner in which 
this service shall be performed, or considered as performed, either in the 
Armed Forces or in public service shall be regulated by law. (p. 146) 
Thus, the manner in which national service will be performed is up to legislature, 
and the current course is that every male Turkish citizen is subject to serve in accordance 
with the Recruitment Act (1927). 
b. Brief Description of the Turkish Draft 
Already weakened and having lost its manpower in the 19th century due to the 
rebellions of the Bosnians, Albanians, Cretans, and Bulgarians and having fought four 
Russo-Turkish Wars (the 6th to 9th Russo-Turkish Wars, which lasted a total of 11 years), 
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the 20th century began with significant threats to the Ottoman Empire. From 1911 through 
its dissolution in 1922, Ottoman troops fought in several battles, including the Italo-Turkish 
War, two Balkan Wars, and the First World War. Only the Gallipoli Campaign (1915–
1916) had a casualty estimation of 250,000 with 65,000 killed in action. A universal 
military draft became crucial in defeating such threats against the nation’s very existence, 
and it was first introduced in 1916 with the Military Service Law.  
The new state was built by Ataturk in 1923 over the remnants of the Ottoman 
Empire, and the Republic of Turkey utilized the same military service law until 1927. With 
the new Recruitment Act that came into force on 20 March 1927, the rules of recruitment 
and the structure of the military were reestablished. Under article 2 of this law (The Turkish 
Recruitment Act, 1927):  
Military [eligibility] age for every man shall be according to his age 
recorded in his basic citizenship register and shall begin on 1st January of 
the year when he reaches the age of 20 and shall end on 1st January of the 
year when he reaches the age of 41. Military [eligibility] age shall mostly 
be for a period of 21 years, but [the period] may be extended, or reduced, 
by up to five years following the Chief of General Staff’s Office 
demonstrating this to be necessary, the Ministry of National Defense 
proposing it and Council of Ministers decreeing it. (p. 832) 
With minor adjustments in several articles regarding service periods, service types, 
and deferment issues, the TAF still relies on the Recruitment Act of 1927 to fill its military 
billets. One major overhaul occurred in 2011 with the initiation of the Contracting Private 
Act (Code 6191). It was an attempt toward professionalism and the aim was filling critical 
billets to fight more effectively against the Kurdish terrorist group (PKK) in the 
southeastern part of Turkey. Expectations for the number of contracting privates were high, 
but the demand for these positions was relatively low among eligible Turkish males.  
c. Service Periods 
According to Article 2 of the Turkish Recruitment Act (1927), obligated service 
under the draft starts at the age of 20 and ends at the age of 41, which accounts for a total 
service period of 21 years. The total service period encompasses three periods under 
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current recruiting practice; these periods are referred to as call, active duty, and reserve 
(The Turkish Recruitment Act, 1927). 
(1) Call 
The period starts on the first January of the year when young male citizens reach 
the age of 20. Under the responsibility of the conscription offices throughout Turkey, 
necessary information is provided to candidate-draftees within that year. The recruitment 
system necessitates that all male Turkish citizens above the age of 20—with good medical 
and psychological health and within acceptable Body Mass Index (BMI) values—enlist in 
the TAF (The Turkish Recruitment Act, 1927). Provided that the liable citizen enrolls in 
college or continues his education, he can defer his military responsibility until the age of 
29. Except for the police, there is no occupation that permits exemption from conscription. 
However, a few other exemptions are granted. For instance, if one son of the family lost 
his life while serving in the military, his brothers or sons are considered exempt from 
military service. The law does not recognize any exemption for conscientious objectors. 
(2) Active Duty 
There are four call-up periods for inductees—February, May, August, and 
November. An active-duty period starts when liable young men report to their military 
installation in batches. The length of an active-duty period varies according to service type 
of the draftees, which is discussed below under service types. 
(3) Reserve 
After completing active duty, all Turkish male citizens are under the reserve call 
until the 1st January of the year in which they reach the age of 41. In case of a mobilization 
order, they are required to report to the closest conscription office in 48 hours. Failing to 
do so is punishable according to Article 63–64 of the Turkish Military Penal Code (1930). 
d. Service Types 
Two types of service are utilized in the TAF: draftees, under compulsory service, 
and volunteers, starting with the Contracting Private Act (Code 6191) in 2011: 
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(1) Compulsory Service (Draftees) 
Draftees have three types of active-duty service. Educational attainment of the 
draftee and the needs of the TAF determine the service type, which include the following:  
• Twelve months of service as a private 
• Twelve months of service as a reserve officer (3rd lieutenant) 
• Six months of service as a corporal/sergeant 
Draftees who are not four-year college graduates are obligated to serve as privates 
for twelve months. Four-year college graduates have the option to serve twelve months as 
a reserve officer or six months as a corporal/sergeant. Draftees who opt to serve twelve 
months as a reserve officer have the same rights as do a career officer. However, the TAF 
has the final authority to determine the service type of four-year college graduates in 
accordance with its manpower needs and the vocational qualifications of the draftee. In 
addition to these service types, in the past, paid military service exemption laws have 
permitted young men to “buy out” of their compulsory service. This option is discussed 
separately later.  
(2) Contracting Privates (Volunteers) 
According to the Contracting Private Act (2011), two groups of men are eligible to 
serve as contracting privates in the TAF: 
• High school graduates under the age of 20 (those who have not completed 
their military service yet) 
• Elementary school graduates (at a minimum) under the age 25 
(irrespective of whether they have served before as a draftee) 
Currently, the total number of contracting privates is relatively limited, but the 
Contracting Private Act can be interpreted as a small step toward having an All-Volunteer 
Force. As Engin (2016) asserts, the current draft system of the TAF has inefficiencies 
stemming from “low quality of enlistees, high turnover rates and management problems.” 
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At the same time, increasing the number of contracting privates in the coming years may 
help to create a more effective fighting force for the Turkish nation.  
e. Draft Evasion and Desertion 
Article 89 of the Turkish Recruitment Act (1927) defines both draft evasion and 
desertion as crimes, and these violations are liable to punishment according to the Turkish 
Military Penal Code (1930). Article 63 of the Turkish Military Penal Code (1930) dictates 
that draft evasion can result in the following punishment during peacetime:  
• Imprisonment of up to six months for those who report themselves within 
four months; 
• Imprisonment of two months to six months for those who are arrested 
within four months; 
• Imprisonment of two months to one year for those who report themselves 
between four months and one year; 
• Imprisonment of six months to three years for those who are arrested 
between four months and one year; 
• Imprisonment of four months to two years for those who report 
themselves after one year; 
• Imprisonment of six months to three years for those who are arrested after 
one year. (p. 1118) 
During wartime, draft evasion is punishable with harsher sentences: 
• Imprisonment of one month to one year for those who report themselves 
within seven days; 
• Imprisonment of four months to two years for those who are arrested 
within seven days; 
• Imprisonment of not less than two years for those who report themselves 
within seven days and three months; 
• Imprisonment of not less than three years for those who are arrested within 
seven days and three months; 
• Imprisonment of not less than five years for those who report themselves 
after three months; 
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• Death sentence for those who are arrested after three months. (Turkish 
Military Penal Code, 1930, p. 1118) 
Articles 66–68 of the Turkish Military Penal Code define desertion and its liable 
punishments. Desertion is punishable with imprisonment of up to three years, up to five 
years’ imprisonment in the event of fleeing abroad, and a life sentence if fleeing when 
confronting the enemy (Turkish Military Penal Code, 1930, p. 1120). Lastly, according to 
articles 79–81, rendering oneself ineligible to serve with wrongdoings such as self-
mutilation and false document fabrication is subject to punishment of up to ten years’ 
imprisonment (Turkish Military Penal Code, 1930, p. 1123). 
3. Paid Military Service Exemptions 
a. General 
Militaries are one of oldest professions of organized states. According to Maslow’s 
hierarchy of needs theory, after basic physiological needs (e.g., eating and sleeping), 
security and safety are the second-most important need of a person (Maslow, 1982, p. 46). 
Therefore, the ancient clans in the Fertile Crescent formed the first villages, then states, to 
create a secure environment for their members. Since these first ancient civilizations, an 
ideal state was defined as one where its citizens could maximize their well-being. Yet, there 
is also a very costly burden to be shared to maximize the well-being of all citizens, and that 
is military service.  
This raises the question of “Who serves when not all serve?” The Marshall 
Commission in the United States sought to answer to this question in 1967, during a period 
when U.S. military conscription was particularly active. The Commission released a report, 
and its main premise was that the benefits and burdens of serving in the military must be 
shared equally between different groups of society (Eitelberg, 1979). Therefore, military 
service must be free of any racial, economic, or social discrimination. This included the 
overrepresentation of racial or ethnic minorities in combat roles, which had occurred during 
the early years of America’s war in Vietnam (Eitelberg, 1979).  
On the other hand, as seen in Table 5, despite the global trend toward professional 
armies, Turkey still relies on the universal draft. Thus, this question is not a practical 
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concern for Turkey, apart from paid military service exemption laws, which can create 
economic discrimination and explicitly dictate a situation where “the poor serve when not 
all serve.”  There are even some folksongs about this unjust situation: 
The road to Yemen is full of graves; soldiers’ food is in copper plates. 
Our riches do give the money; our soldiers are of the poor. (Coskun, 2014) 
Moreover, establishing a compensation fee for military service can be very 
controversial. Based on historical data, it is easy to define a casualty ratio for the military 
service to find its associated risks. According the aforementioned premise, this risk must 
be shared among the Turkish citizens. However, to try to find the value of someone’s life 
and express it in monetary terms is wrong on a moral basis. Thus, there is no universally 
convincing and acceptable way to find a breakeven point to compensate for the military 
service.  
b. History 
Different forms of paid military service date back to the Ottoman Empire Era when 
only Muslims were liable to serve in the military. To compensate for this situation, a tax 
was levied on non-Muslims. Below are the compensation taxes for non-Muslims. 
• Jizya: Based on Sharia Law, a tax on non-Muslims levied for the 
exemption from military service until 1855. 
• Baddal-askari: A new tax named baddal-askari took place of Jizya, which 
non-Muslims are liable as a substitution for military service (Global 
Investment & Business Center, 2013, p. 36). 
With the Tanzimat Reforms in 1846, the lottery draft was introduced to staff the 
Ottoman troops and Muslims were given to option to buy out their military service. Below 
are the exemption requirements.  
• Bedel-i şahsı: The regulation of 1846 introduced the system of allowing 
Muslims to purchase their exemption from the service by obtaining a 
substitute.  
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• Bedel-i nakdi: The regulation of 1846 introduced the system of allowing 
Muslims to purchase their exemption from the service by paying money 
(Gulsoy, 2002). 
The Turkish Republic uses its universal draft to meet TAF’s manpower needs in 
accordance with The Turkish Recruitment Act of 1927. However, based on temporary laws 
enacted several times after the 1980s, eligible men had the option to purchase a paid 
exemption from compulsory military service. Table 4 compares selected information on 
these temporary laws between 1987 and 2014.  
Table 4. Comparison of temporary military service exemption laws, 
1987–2014. Adapted from “Gecmisten gunumuze” (2018). 







1987 18,433 40 $8,000 $147,464,000 
1992 35,111 27 $8,000 $280,888,000 
1999 72,290 27 $8,000 $578,320,000 
2011 69,073 29 $16,000 $1,105,168,000 
2014 203,824 27 $8,000 $1,630,592,000 
 
4. Conclusion 
The institutional settings, history, methods of manpower procurement, and service 
types of the Turkish Armed Forces are explained in the previous section. General principles 
and a description of the Turkish Universal Draft are also discussed.  
Therefore, in the field of Turkish military service, one can observe three incumbent 
institutional logics: universal draft, paid military service exemptions, and long-desired 
professionalization (Gokoglu, Kalemci, & Tuzun, 2015). 
a. Universal Draft 
Despite the worldwide trend toward professional armies, Turkey, which has 
NATO’s second largest military, is one of the few countries that still relies on a universal 
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draft for its manpower needs. Every year, in batches, thousands of young men are enlisted 
for six-to-twelve months of what is called “national service” by the Turkish constitution.  
Having consolidated by nationalist ideology, every male citizen of Turkey must 
serve the nation as a citizenship duty. This situation comes into existence in the daily lives 
Turkish citizens with the saying, “Every Turk is born soldier.” The motto of “strong army, 
strong nation” is displayed with the Turkish flag on mountainous parts of many Turkish 
cities. 
b. Paid Military Service Exemptions 
Backed by capitalist ideas and with a strong emphasis on economic rationality, the 
option of buying out of military service was introduced by several governments with 
different political stances. Based on temporary laws enacted several times since the 
inception of the Turkish Republic, eligible men were given the option to purchase a paid 
exemption from compulsory military service. This policy is still the focus of ongoing 
debate within Turkey and will be examined thoroughly in the coming chapters. 
c. Professionalism 
“Professionalism” is a hot topic in the Turkish military arena. As seen in Table 3, 
professionals constitute approximately 42 to 45 percent of the combined Army/Navy/Air 
Force, the Gendarmerie, and the total TAF. In the much smaller Coast Guard, professionals 
account for 61 percent of the total. 
The initiation of the Contracting Private Act (Code 6191) in 2011 was an attempt 
toward increased professionalism by creating more long-term continuity within the ranks. 
The aim was filling critical billets to fight more effectively against the Kurdish terrorist 
group (PKK) in the southeastern part of Turkey. Expectations for the number of contracting 
privates were high, but the demand for these positions was relatively low among eligible 
Turkish men as seen in Table 1.  
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Nationalist and patriotic ideas emerged with the French Revolution and spread 
throughout the world in the 19th century. Nationalism, patriotism, and militarism 
intersected, according to Onbaşı (2016) such that “the militarization of society through 
national armies whereby a nation in its entirety became the actor of war and the state 
devoted all its attention to mobilizing these masses with feelings of patriotism and keeping 
them ready for war” (p. 885). 
In the dawn of the 20th century, a universal draft was widely employed to meet the 
manpower needs of the nations. According to British General Sir Ian Hamilton, 
conscription was a machine that transforms 
Sealed-pattern citizens by the hundred thousand; backs straightened, chests 
broadened, clean, obedient, punctual, but on the other hand, weakened in 
their individual initiative. Yes, conscription is a tremendous leveler. The 
proud are humbled; the poor spirited are strengthened; the national idea is 
fostered; the interplay of varying ideals is sacrificed. Good or bad, black or 
white, all are chucked indifferently into the mill, and emerge there from, no 
longer black or white, but a drab, uniform khaki. (Altinay, 2004, p. 62) 
By the late modern era (1952–1990), the universal draft was abolished in most 
countries due to the economic and sociopolitical concerns of nations as well as the 
changing character of threats that demand high-quality professionals. Table 5 provides a 
comparative analysis of trends in the armies of Turkey and Western countries based on 
selected characteristics during identified eras from 1922 to present.  
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Table 5. Comparison of trends in the USA-Europe and Turkey by 
























































































As seen in Table 5, the perceived threat for western countries had changed after the 
Cold War era. During the Cold War, for western countries, the focal point of security 
understanding was the threat caused by the Warsaw Pact, led by the Soviet Union. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union brought radical changes to threat perception of the Western 
States. In the post-modern era, perceived threats were ethnic conflict and global terrorism 
instead of nuclear war or enemy invasion. But for Turkey, the problematic war-torn 
neighbors and and separatist Kurdish Terrorist movements necessitated a different path 
from the other western countries. Turkey still employs a reduced “mass army” with 
shortened service periods to cope with 4-decades of enduring the PKK terror problem in 
the eastern and southeastern parts of the country.  
Therefore, despite the worldwide trend toward professional armies, Turkey, which 
has NATO’s second-largest active military, is one of the few countries that still rely on a 
universal draft for its manpower needs (Global Fire Power, n.d.). Kurt (2001) claims that 
a universal draft is not the most efficient way to meet Turkey’s defense needs and that 
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improving the current manpower system will result in a better defense capability and less 
of a burden on the national budget (p. 53). 
 At the same time, Engin (2016) asserts that, owing to limited compensation, the 
only way to shift the utility curve upward for a draftee is to shirk. That is, the current system 
may fail to fully incentivize draftees to perform better (Engin, 2016, p. 93). Recognizing 
this fact, conscription, by its very nature, creates an inefficient environment. Yet, Engin 
(2016) also notes that the unique position of the military in Turkish society still turns 
compulsory military service, which is an unpleasant activity for the citizens of many 
nations, into a sacred duty (p. 36). 
Some social and historical undercurrents—such as Ataturk’s positive effect, service 
as a sacred duty, and the “military nation” phenomenon—have shaped popular views 
toward the military in Turkish society. Thus, a pure economic-efficiency analysis of a 
universal draft in Turkey may fail to account for certain vital dimensions of the issue. For 
the sake of overcoming this challenge, Engin (2016) utilizes the “Population 
Representation Model” (PRM), which was introduced by Eitelberg (1979) to evaluate the 
All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in the United States. Eitelberg’s (1979) original model has 
three criteria: political legitimacy, social equity, and military effectiveness (p. 404). Even 
though the PRM is not capable of providing numeric values, it enhances perception of the 
issue by its social, political, and military dimensions that are tied to optimal population 
representation (Engin, 2016). 
Within the PRM framework, Engin (2016) first suggests that, if the universal draft 
were brought to an end, “it could create irreversible side effects as long as political 
legitimacy and social equity are involved” (p. 95). In this sense, reasons stem from the 
distinct features of Turkish society, popular views toward the military, the effects of being 
next to a war-torn region, the fight against terrorism, and so forth. For example, given the 
fight against terrorism and the composition of the terrorist organization, a Turkish AVF 
could profoundly damage social equity. 
On the other hand, Engin’s (2016) subsequent claim is that “the present draft system 
may have adverse consequences for the effectiveness of the Turkish military” (p. 97). 
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Engin uses three reasons to support his claim: the relatively low quality of enlistees, high 
personnel turnover rates, and manpower management problems. Due to limited screening 
of draftees and conscription of all young men from every walk of life, problems in Turkish 
society are likely to arise in the TAF. According to Eitelberg (1979): “Perfect 
representation implies that the worst, as well as the best, elements of society be present in 
the ranks of the military” (p. 350) Secondly, considering incoming draftees arriving in 
batches every three months and their twelve-month period of service, turnover rates are 
relatively huge in the TAF. Lastly, draftees have no clear incentive to perform better, and 
the only way for them to increase their marginal utility is to shirk. Thus, the interests of the 
TAF and its draftees tend to clash and can easily give rise to a substantial management 
problem.  
In their study, Akyurek & Yilmaz (2013) sought to understand the perceptions of 
Turkish citizens regarding compulsory military service (p. 4). They asked the survey 
questions (as statements requiring agreement or disagreement) shown below, with the 
accompanying affirmative responses: 
• Compulsory military should be terminated and professionals must serve: 
65.4 percent affirmative answers from participants. 
• Compulsory military service affects the civilian career of draftees 
negatively: 61.1 percent affirmative answers from participants.  
• Compulsory military service is an essential process related to the 
education of young people: 50.3 percent affirmative answers from the 
participants. 
• Termination of compulsory military service damages the military-society 
relationship: 44.3 percent affirmative answers from the participants. 
When the responses to survey questions shown here are evaluated together, it is 
seen that the perceived negative effects of compulsory military service are more prominent 
and there is a significant desire for change.  
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On the other hand, based on temporary laws enacted several times after the 1980s, 
draft-eligible men had the option to purchase a paid exemption from compulsory military 
service. Since paid military service has been initiated in Turkish history by several 
governments with different political objectives (i.e., Nationalist, center-right, and center-
left), there is little doubt regarding the perceived legitimacy of this act (Onbaşı, 2016).  
At the same time, there exists an astonishing contradiction in the Turkish military 
framework, as Onbaşı (2016) observes: “Turkey is the only European country where 
conscientious objection is not legal while military service is compulsory” (p. 884).  Here 
stands an interesting case where paid military service is legitimate but conscientious 
objection is not. Onbaşı tries to decipher this striking contradiction by illustrating the 
interconnection between capitalism, militarism, nationalism, and patriarchy that shapes 
Turkish mainstream politics.  
According to Onbaşı (2016), since the existence of the modern Turkish Republic, 
there exists the reciprocally consolidating effect of “patriarchy, nationalism, and 
militarism” in daily life or political discourse. She asserts that previous literature has made 
it clear that this “troika” is embodied in “the image of 
brave/patriot/warrior/rational/masculine man that is valued more than any other identity 
(such as women and LGBTI)” (p. 884).  
However, the mere presence of a group of men who are not willing to be drafted 
poses a direct challenge to the current hegemony that is shaped by this equilibrium. Onbaşı 
(2016) continues, stating that the missing part of this self-consolidating equilibrium was 
completed in the 1980s with the integration of the Turkish economy into global capitalism, 
resulting in an emphasis of an economically rational, utility-maximization type of thinking. 
As a result, in Turkey’s striking contradiction, “the concept of conscientious objection puts 
a spoke in the wheel, and ... paid military service steps into fix it” (Onbaşı, 2016, p. 884). 
Whether the paid military service exemption is fixing the problems of current 
hegemony or not, it is still the focus of an ongoing political debate in Turkey.   Despite the 
TAF’s clear disapproval of paid military service exemptions, the ruling Justice and 
Development Party (JDP) revisited this policy in 2014, allowing the exemption of men 
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over the age of 27 years from universal draft in return for a payment of $8,000 (in the 
equivalent of U.S. dollars).  
Limited studies are available regarding the effects of the paid military service 
exemption in Turkey, and current literature lacks a grand-scheme analysis of the paid 
service exemption. A study by Torun and Tumen (2016) addresses the education and labor-
market outcomes of the paid military service initiated on November 1999. The eligible 
group included men over 27 years old at the time of this act, and the service exemption fee 
was 15,000 Deutschmark ($8,000 U.S. dollars in the 1999 exchange rate). Thus, the cut-
off birth date was December 31, 1972. Men who were born before this date were eligible, 
whereas men born on January 1, 1973 or thereafter were ineligible. The primary motivation 
behind this act was to raise some money to compensate for the devastating aftermath of the 
1999 Izmit Earthquake that had a death toll of nearly 17,000 people and left one-half 
million Turkish citizens homeless (Marza, 2004). 
Torun and Tumen (2016) use data from a Turkish Household Labor Force Survey, 
conducted between 2004 and 2013, for their empirical analysis. Even though it is not 
possible to deduce which individuals had used the paid military service exemption from 
these data, with the help of the cut-off date, the authors can distinguish between eligible 
and ineligible men. Thus, there are clearly separated control and treatment groups, given 
not everyone in the treatment group uses the option of buying out of his compulsory 
military service. Due to these shortcomings of a perfectly compliant treatment group, 
Torun and Tumen state that “the estimates should be interpreted as the intention-to-treat 
effect” (p. 3). 
After applying difference in differences, triple difference, and Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) techniques, the estimates are consistent in a way that the paid military 
service exemption act is significantly correlated with 0.15–0.20 year reduction with the 
total years of education completed (Torun & Tumen, 2016). The authors further assert that 
interpreting this association may be decreased incentives to continue further education for 
the eligible group. According to the Turkish Recruitment Act (1969), if the draftee holds a 
four-year university or further degree, there can be some deferment of conscription and 
allowance for shortened service time.  
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Additionally, Torun and Tumen (2016) find evidence to suggest that paid military 
service is correlated with a decline in labor income, and this is most likely due to a 
significant reduction in education. To check for the robustness of their estimates, the 
authors perform the same statistical analyses with women and placebo treatment groups. 
The results of these analyses fail to show any similar effect on education and labor 
outcomes. 
The current literature on paid military service exemptions in Turkey lacks a grand-
scheme analysis, and there is no study yet that takes into account the political, social, and 
military outcomes of the exemption laws. Chapter III lays out the recent developments that 
are in the scope of this research. Chapter IV examines the unique social trends in Turkey 
that differentiates it from any other country. The insights gained from Eitelberg’s (1979) 
original population representation model are then leveraged to evaluate these military 
service exemption acts in Chapter V. 
 
25 
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Chapter II reviewed the institutional settings of Turkish Armed Forces and 
literature surrounding the development of the paid military service exemptions in Turkey.  
This chapter discusses recent developments that shape or show public attitudes 
toward the military in Turkey. First, the chapter reviews the attempted military coup in July 
2016 and the aftereffects of this unfortunate event. The chapter then examines the long-
term, agonizing conflict with Kurdish Separatist Terrorist Group called PKK. Lastly, the 
chapter assesses Turkey’s most recent law regarding paid military service. 
A. AFTERMATH OF THE ATTEMPTED MILITARY COUP  
On the 15th of July, 2016, a faction in the TAF attempted to overthrow the ruling 
government. Previously, The Turkish National Security Council (TNSC) was aware of the 
threat, and had made judgments about this faction for the first time on February 26, 2014. 
The council had gathered 14 times until May 26, 2016. During this period, the faction was 
assessed as “a threat to public peace and national security,” an “illegal structure within the 
state structure,” and a “parallel state” (Ozturk, 2016). 
It was only after the TNSC meeting held on May 26, 2016 that the word “terrorist” 
was used for this faction. At this meeting, the faction was called the “Fetullahist Terrorist 
Organization (FETO),” which operated in cooperation with other terrorist organizations. It 
was declared by the council that the fight with FETO would continue in a determined 
manner (Ozturk, 2016). Unfortunately, in less than 2 months after this declaration, the coup 
attempt took place on July 15, 2016, to overthrow the ruling government.  
The coup plot failed largely because of the solid actions taken by the government 
and the resistance of the remaining TAF personnel, police, and Turkish citizens toward the 
plotters. As a dire consequence, in one night, 240 Turkish citizens died and more than 500 
citizens were wounded in the conflicts in several cities of Turkey (“15 Temmuz Darbe 
Girişiminin Bilançosu,” 2016).  
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Turkish officials declared a self-exiled cleric and his FETO movement responsible 
for the attempted coup. According to the report of the Turkish National Intelligence 
Agency, since its inception, the ultimate goal of this movement was to seize state power 
(FETO’nun Yapilanmasi, 2017). To reach this end, supporters of the movement reportedly 
infiltrated the TAF by hiding their association for several decades (Akyol, 2016). This 
would help to explain the large number of generals identified as taking part in the coup.  
The raison d’etre of the TAF is to protect Turkish citizens and the state against any 
internal or external threats. Prior to this attempted coup, the military was considered well-
positioned and highly admired in Turkey. It was the first time in Turkish history that 
citizens bore arms (or other weapons) to protect their country from their own military.  
This tragic event affected popular views toward the military. A public opinion poll 
conducted two months after the attempted coup indicated that the TAF had lost its long-
held position as “the most-trusted institution” in the country. As of August 2016, the most 
trusted institutions in Turkey were the Police and the President, followed by the Parliament 
and the Government. Public trust in the TAF fell to the seventh position on the structured 
list,  after the Judiciary and the opposition parties in the Parliament (Cevikcan, 2016). 
On the other hand, this unfortunate event served as a “litmus test” to detect 
supporters of the movement to overthrow the government. After defeat of the coup, the 
plotters were arrested and expelled from the TAF. According to the Minister of Internal 
Affairs, 8,113 personnel, including 151 generals/admirals, took part in the plot and were 
arrested (“Darbe Girisiminin Bilançosu Acıklandı,” 2016). After thorough investigations, 
being announced by the TAF officials, as of January 2018, a total of 9,236 personnel were 
laid off and 5,399 ex-TAF personnel were arrested due to their connection with FETO 
(“TSK Icerisinde,” 2018). In terms of end-strength, this amounts to 6 percent of the 
professional component of TAF manpower and 42 percent of all generals/admirals.  
After the failed coup attempt, with governmental decrees, there have been some 
changes in the structure of the TAF. By the decision of the Council of Ministers, the Coast 
Guard and the Gendarmerie are now subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in both 
27 
peacetime and wartime with the regulation number of 2016/9742 (The Coast Guard and 
Gendarmerie Personnel Act, 2016). 
Before this regulation, the Coast Guard and the Gendarmerie, which also have 
military capabilities, were subordinate to the Navy and Army Commands in wartime. 
With these recent developments, current military manpower totals of the TAF are 
shown in Table 6. 
Table 6. Number of professionals in TAF, April 2018 
Status Army, Navy, Air Force Change 
Commissioned officer 26,842 32% decrease 
Non-com. Officer 63,730 46% decrease 
Specialist 58,172    21% decrease 
Contracting Private 19,527    69% increase 
Total 166,271    31% decrease 
Source: Personnel Department of General Chief of Staff, personal communication, May 8, 2018. 
 
In each row, the change column shows the percent difference as of April 2018 when 
compared with the total number as of May 2016. For example, the percent change for 
commissioned officers is calculated in the following manner: 100 times (39,711 minus 
26,842) divided by 39,711 equals 32 (rounded), where the previous total in May 2016 was 
39,711. 
Table 7. Number of non-professionals in TAF, April 2018 
Status Army, Navy, Air Force Change 
3rd Lt.(Reserve Officer) 9,969 40% increase 
Private/Corporal/Sergeant 288,152 7% decrease 
Total 298,121 6% decrease 






Table 8. Total personnel strength in TAF, April 2018 
Status Army, Navy, Air Force Change 
Professionals 166,271 31% decrease 
Non-professionals 298,121 6% decrease 
Total 464,392 17% decrease 
Source: Personnel Department of General Chief of Staff, personal communication, May 8, 2018. 
 
As seen in Tables 6–8, there are increases over the two-year timeframe only in the 
number of contracting privates and reserve officers. Commissioned officers and non-
commissioned officers (Table 6) were affected greatly by the recent developments, as 
professionals combined (Table 8) experienced a strength decline of 31 percent.  
B. CURRENT FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM 
The Turkish nation has faced a terrorism problem caused by a Kurdish Separatist 
Terrorist Group called PKK for over 30 years. This situation has had many adverse effects 
on the daily lives of the Turkish people. Thousands of TAF personnel have been martyred 
by the guerilla attacks of the PKK; innocent villagers, teachers have been massacred by 
this terrorist group in the eastern and southeastern parts of Turkey; and the Turkish 
economy has lost billions of dollars to eradicate this terrorism problem. 
According to a commission report about violations of human rights presented in the 
Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) in 2013, the total death toll caused by PKK 
terror in Turkey between the years of 1984 and 2010 is shown in Figure 2.
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As seen in Figure 2, brutal attacks of PKK terrorists peaked, claiming many 
innocent lives, between the years of 1989 and 1999. This corresponds with the capture of 
Abdullah Ocalan (the founder and leader of PKK) in Nairobi Airport, Kenya and his return 
to Turkey for imprisonment.   
The statistics and numbers are too ruthless, cold, and soulless to describe the 
damage and pain caused by the treacherous assaults of PKK. Nevertheless, the poem below 
(found in the pocket of a 20-year-old draftee when he was martyred by a PKK ambush on 
April 11, 1999) helps to understand the magnitude of the grief and agony caused by the 
PKK. The draftee had seen his girlfriend for the last time 46 days prior to his death and the 
poem was for her. 
We! like the two strange passengers, 
See, this crowd is coming to your wedding and to my funeral, 
These drums are beating for your wedding and for my funeral,  
They will throw flower bouquets over you, they will throw soil on me, 
They will hold your beautiful hennaed hands, and they will carry my coffin, 
You will be registered as married, and Me, as martyred.  
(TBMM Insan Haklari Inceleme Komisyonu, 2013, p. 229)  
In daily life, terrorism often depends on violence or a deadly threat. Terrorism is 
defined as the power or pressure applied to a person to force him/her to do something 
against his/her will, and violence is the main tool to compel such action. Most of the time 
in terrorism, there is a political aim. Generally, terrorism strives to ensure that the target 
group or nation is moving toward a desired political atmosphere (Dumanoglu, 2004, p. 84). 
Therefore, the main characteristics of a terrorist act are described succinctly as follows: 
• Use of violence to a person or persons, 
• To be based on a political purpose, 
• Damaging people or entities that represent the state power, 
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• Continuity and systematic(planned) actions, 
• Aim of creating a fear atmosphere (TBMM Insan Haklari Inceleme 
Komisyonu, 2013, p. 30) 
The idea of the PKK was born in Ankara among a group of communist Kurdish 
students led by Abdullah Ocalan in 1974. A few years later, they decided to move the 
southeastern part of Turkey, and they founded PKK on November 27, 1978 in Diyarbakir 
(Gunter, 1990, p. 61). During their first years, armed groups of PKK were not yet to ready 
to fight in the rural areas. Their violence and attacks were focused in the urban centers of 
Turkey’s eastern and southeastern cities, claiming 350 citizen lives (Ozdag, 2005, p. 25). 
At the beginning of the 1980s, with the help of Iraqi Kurds, armed groups of PKK 
started to camp in the mountains of northern Iraq where they would recruit more terrorists, 
train them in guerrilla warfare, and start planning ambush tactics in rural parts of Turkey. 
The first attack of PKK terrorists in a village took place in November, 1984 in Sirnak, with 
a death toll of nine people, including 5 women and 2 children. (Ozdag, 2005, p. 39). Their 
attacks on villagers became more intense over the years, as they also gathered and 
intimidated villagers to brainwash them against the Turkish Republic. 
In 1986, PKK had recruited enough terrorists to attack a gendarme station, where 
they killed 14 TAF personnel in Hakkari, a city in eastern Turkey. In 1987, PKK attacks 
peaked, as they attacked 14 villages, claiming 237 civilian lives. At the same time, PKK 
militants burned 137 Turkish schools that they determined were “the tool of Turkish 
Republic’s so-called assimilation policy” (Ozdag, 2005, p. 43).  
One summer night in June 1987, PKK militants attacked the Pinarcik village of 
Mardin, a city in southeastern Turkey, close to Syrian border. They gathered around the 
village and killed 30 villagers, including 16 children and 8 women. According to Turkish 
officials, “it was the worst massacre ever committed by the Kurdish insurgents fighting an 
undeclared war against the Turkish Republic” (Gunter, 1990, p. 70). The PKK’s ultimate 
motive in attacking villages and schools was to create fear in the minds of citizens and the 
perception that the Turkish Republic was unable to protect its people.  
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After the capture of Abdullah Ocalan in Nairobi Airport in 1999, the terrorist leader 
was imprisoned on Imrali Island. Since then, and for nearly 20 years, PKK attacks have 
not ceased. Some believe that Ocalan is still instructing his terrorist militants with the help 
of his attorneys. 
The TAF started operations in Iraq in March 2018, heading toward Qandil. Opening 
a corridor towards Qandil, TAF controls approximately 400 square kilometers and 
established a number of bases in the region, and also neutralized hundreds of terrorists. The 
ultimate goal of the operation is to completely eliminate the terror slots in Qandil (Saldirli, 
2018). 
PKK’s main aim is to establish a new state, a “so-called Kurdistan,” in the Middle 
East. To reach this end, militants of the organization have used suicide bombers, raids, 
sabotage, and kidnaps, especially in the eastern and southeastern parts of Turkey for the 
past four decades. The shocking fact is these militants are largely born in the eastern and 
southeastern parts of Turkey, as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of the terrorists by the cities they were born. Source: TBMM Insan Haklari Inceleme Komisyonu 
(2013, p. 45).
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As seen in the Figure-3, PKK militants are born mainly in the eastern and 
southeastern parts of Turkey (particularly in Diyarbakir and Mardin) where the Kurdish 
population lives more intensely. They have poor educational backgrounds, and they join 
the PKK terrorist organization at very young ages, before being drafted to serve in the TAF.  
Figure 4 was prepared based on a survey of 262 detained members of the PKK. As 
seen here, the average age of PKK militants is around 20 years. More than half of these 
PKK members are illiterate or have not progressed educationally beyond elementary 
school. A number of these young men are likely TAF draft evaders. Indeed, many anecdotal 
stories are told about one brother serving his country in the TAF, while another is a terrorist 
in the PKK.  
 
Figure 4. Distribution of imprisoned PKK militants according to their 
educational attainment and age. Adapted from TBMM Insan Haklari 
Inceleme Komisyonu (2013, p. 41).  
The long, seemingly endless conflict with the PKK could adversely affect public 
opinion about compulsory military service, especially within the green regions depicted in 
Figure 3. Taking into account the relatively young age distribution of PKK militants in 
Figure 4, potential draft evaders could easily buy out of their military service, changing 





















C. INTRODUCTION OF A NEW PAID MILITARY SERVICE EXEMPTION 
LAW 
Paid military service exemption laws were enacted several times in Turkish history. 
By itself, only the ruling Justice and Development Party, in power since 2002, has enacted 
these exemption laws—three times, in 2011, 2014, and 2018. Preceding governments that 
passed paid military service exemption laws—in 1987, 1992, and 1999—represented   
different political positions. The six temporary laws were introduced by different ruling 
parties with diverse political standpoints as given in Table 9. 
Table 9. The Ruling Parties that introduced temporary paid military 
service exemption laws. Adapted from Netdata (n.d.). 
Exemption 
Year 
The Ruling Party / Parties Political Standpoint 
1987 Motherland Party Center-right Neoliberal  
1992 True Path Party Center-right  
 
1999 
Coalition (Democratic Left Party &  
Nationalist Movement Party & 
Motherland Party) 
Social democracy, Social liberalism, Secularism and Kemalism 
Turkish nationalism shaped by Islam 
Center-right Neoliberal 
2011 Justice and Development Party Social conservative 
2014 Justice and Development Party Social conservative 
2018 Justice and Development Party Social conservative 
 
According to Onbaşı (2016), the diverse political views of the various governments 
that introduced military exemption laws indicates that buying out of military service is 
politically legitimate (p. 884). In other words, it is considered fundamentally legal and 
acceptable to a majority of the nation’s citizenry. 
The most recent paid military service exemption law came into force on the 3rd of 
August, 2018 with eligibility assigned to those born before January 1, 1994. Thus, men 
who were born before this date were eligible, whereas men born on January 1, 1994 or 
thereafter were ineligible. The final date to apply for this paid military service exemption 
was the November 4, 2018 with a payment of 15,000 Turkish Liras, as announced by the 
Turkish Ministry of Defense. According to exchange rates of the Central Bank of the 
Republic of Turkey, this amount equals approximately $2,700 in U.S. currency (Central 
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Bank of the Republic of Turkey, n.d.). For comparison, Table 9 shows the cut-off ages, the 
amount of exemption fees (in U.S. dollars), and the estimated revenue for the temporary 
exemption laws between 1987 and 2018. 
Table 10. Comparison of temporary military service exemption laws, 
1987–2018. Adapted from “Gecmisten gunumuze,” (2018). 







1987 18,433 40 $8,000 $147,464,000 
1992 35,111 27 $8,000 $280,888,000 
1999 72,290 27 $8,000 $578,320,000 
2011 69,073 29 $16,000 $1,105,168,000 
2014 203,824 27 $8,000 $1,630,592,000 
2018 730,775 25 $2,700 $1,973,092,500 
 
As seen in Table 10, the most recent law (2018) introduced the cheapest paid 
military service exemption so far. At the same time, 730,775 young men, well over triple 
the number in 2014, bought out of their compulsory military service. (“Bedelli Askerlik,” 
2018). To be able to understand the real value of an exemption fee for a Turkish citizen, 
one should know the minimum wages in Turkey during a comparable period. Table 11 




Table 11. Minimum Wage in Turkey according to years. Adapted 
from Butce ve Mali Kontrol Genel Mudurlugu (n.d.) and Central Bank of the 












Wage in USD 
Exemption 
Fee 
 Min. Wage 
Ratio 
Jan 01, 2010 729 1.48 492.5675676 
 
Jan 01, 2011 796.5 1.55 513.8709677 31.13622097 
Jan 01, 2012 886.5 1.88 471.5425532 
 
Jan 01, 2013 978.6 1.77 552.8813559 
 
Jan 01, 2014 1,071.00 2.17 493.5483871 16.20915033 
Jan 01, 2015 1,201.50 2.35 511.2765957 
 
Jan 01, 2016 1,647.00 2.94 560.2040816 
 
Jan 01, 2017 1,777.50 3.54 502.1186441 
 
Jan 01, 2018 2,029.50 3.77 538.3289125 
 
Nov 01, 2018 2,029.50 5.58 363.7096774 7.423503326 
 
As seen in Tables 10 and 11, in 2018 potential draftees witnessed and took 
advantage of the cheapest exemption fee (just 7.42 times the minimum wage in Turkey) 
ever introduced, and with the lowest cut-off age. Consequently, well over seven-hundred-
thousand resorted to buying their way out compulsory military service. As a result, the 
TAF lost a substantial portion of its draftee population with relatively low financial 
compensation within just four months. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter first described the aftermath of the attempted military coup in 2016. 
Public polls suggest that the coup has damaged public opinion and trust in the TAF. 
Second, the chapter examined the current fight against the PKK and its effect on the 
Turkish nation for almost four decades. Finally, the study looked at the most recent paid 
military service law, comparing it with previous laws based on eligibility criteria, 
participation, and exemption fees.  
With the recent paid military service exemption act, the TAF lost a substantial 
number of its draftee population with a relatively low fee and comparably modest 
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compensation within just four months. The longer-term consequences of this buyout by 
potential draftees, an unprecedented application of paid military service by historical 
measures, are presently unknown. Chapter IV attempts to better understand the possible 
social and economic implications of the latest military service exemption law. 
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IV. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 
Chapter III examined recent developments that have modified current public 
attitudes toward the military in Turkey. This chapter seeks to understand the social and 
economic implications of paid military service in Turkey. The main objective is to describe 
the relationship of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) with the nation and determine why the 
TAF has been viewed as the most trustworthy institution in the country. The second part 
of the chapter seeks to assess the implications of the TAF’s shrinking budgets and the 
economic costs of a universal draft. 
A. THE MILITARY’S RELATIONS WITH SOCIETY 
In April 2013, the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies prepared a report that 
claimed to show the Turkish public’s perceptions of the TAF with the aid of special surveys 
(Akyurek & Yilmaz, 2013). In the study, public trust of the TAF was measured along with 
similar measures of the Turkish Parliament, the Government, the Judiciary, and the Police. 
The survey revealed that public trust of the TAF was the highest of all institutions 
measured, at 63.9 percent (p. 10). As noted previously, public trust in the TAF has since 
declined, presumably due to the attempted coup of 2016.   
Narli (2000) seeks to understand the nature of the TAF’s relations with the nation 
and why the Turkish people have placed such high levels of trust in the military for so 
many years. She claims that one first needs to understand Ataturk’s effect as the founder 
of modern Turkey and the Ottoman legacy of a hierarchical society to identify the source 
of this trust. She asserts that, based on these two effects, there is significant harmony 
between TAF, the political elite, and the Turkish nation (Narli, 2000). 
Ottoman society was designed vertically with two major tiers. The first tier 
consisted of the sultan, the ulema (clerical elite), and the military. The bottom tier was 
comprised of the subjects—that is, the remaining vast proportion of the nation. Being a 
Pasha in Ottoman society was more than being part of military. Pashas were the governors, 
statesmen, landlords, and judges. Therefore, being a member of the military was an 
opportunity to be leveraged to the first tier.  
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When the modern Republic of Turkey was founded over the remnants of the 
Ottoman Empire by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk on October 29, 1923, the legacy of a highly-
esteemed military continued. In fact, the founding father Ataturk and his friends were 
former Ottoman Pashas. The modernization ideas of the 20th century emerged initially from 
within a group of Turkish officers and ultimately shaped the future of Turkish society. In 
this sense, it can be said that the beloved founder of the Turkish Republic became a symbol 
of the Turkish military. 
Ataturk’s trust in the Turkish military was great, as seen in an address by him at the 
Grand National Assembly of Turkey Republic on the 1st of November, 1937.  
I have no doubt that the army, which is our major national discipline school, 
will also efficiently serve to educate the most needy members of the society 
in our economic, cultural, and social wars. (Ataturk’un Soylev ve 
Demecleri, 2006, p. 417) 
Although prevailing public opinion of the military changed somewhat after the 
coup attempt, the Turkish nation’s trust in the TAF is deeply rooted in its modern history 
and strongly associated with its founding father. Further, this public trust in the TAF 
extends well beyond just defending the country.  
1. The Phenomenon of Military-Nation 
Nationalist movements in Europe, triggered by the French Revolution, resorted to 
three core methods to solidify nationalism within the masses. These methods were: national 
indoctrination in schools, conscription of able men, and elections. Therefore, as in Turkey, 
a nation’s armed forces often served as a citizenship academy (Erozden, 2013, p. 106). 
Although Erozden’s (2013) argument is valid for many nations, the close ties of the 
Turkish people with the military merits more significant attention. The popular motto of 
“Every Turk is born a soldier” is widely used in daily conversations and school curricula, 
this saying is also repeated often by draftees when marching during their compulsory 
military service. Turkish history textbooks typically highlight the following theme: 
The Turk is the best warrior. The Turkish nation has the most advanced 
military spirit; that means a nation which has experienced a deep, immense 
history of civilizations and cultures. It is certain that the Turkish nation, 
41 
which had been an ancestor of all main civilizations since the very 
beginning of mankind, has this spirit in this sophisticated manner. (Altinay 
& Bora, 2002, p. 142) 
Until October 2013, students in primary school in Turkey would repeat a pledge, 
called the “Student Oath,” every morning before entering their classroom. This student 
oath exemplifies the interconnection of the country’s education system, nationality, and the 
patriotic ideas embodied in Ataturk’s modernization principles:   
I am a Turk, honest and hard-working. 
My core principle is protecting my little ones, respecting the olds, and 
loving my nation and country more than my existence. 
My high-esteemed ideal is to rise and to go forward. 
O Great Ataturk 
On the path you have paved, I swear to restlessly walk to reach the goals 
that you have pointed out. 
My existence shall be dedicated to Turkish nation.  
How happy is the one who says I am a Turk. 
The oath was prepared by the Minister of National Education of that time and put 
into practice in 1933. In October 2013, the ruling government ended the practice of reciting 
the student oath. More recently, as a result of objections filed by the Turkish Education 
Union, the Chamber of the State decided to restart the practice of taking the student oath 
as of October 2018 (“Andimiz nedir,” 2018). 
In 1999, Turkey’s Ministry of Culture, Istemihan Talay, wrote a state-published, 
500-page book called “Turkish Military” in close cooperation with the Turkish General 
Staff. In a press conference promoting the book, he asserted: 
Turks have been known as a military-nation throughout history. The 
Turkish military is identical to the core identity of the Turkish nation. The 
Turkish military has always given us numerous victories, great glory, and 
honor throughout our history. (“495 Sayfada,” 1999) 
Altinay (2004) observes that references by Turkish officials to the “military-nation” 
are relatively common in political and cultural discourse (Altinay, 2004, p. 12). In fact, 
42 
nationalism and militarism are frequently connected. Further, the origins of the modern 
TAF date back to 209 BC, when Modu Chanyu (Metehan) integrated nomadic Turkic 
warrior bands to form a permanent military force. These strong historical underpinnings 
and enduring military associations help to explain why the Turkish nation identifies itself 
so remarkably with the military.  
2. Ataturk’s Positive Effects 
After 1923, Turkey entered a revolutionary period that aimed to establish and 
institutionalize a national state. The Turkish military was the most important force in the 
hands of the ruling cadre, especially by the leader of this cadre, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. It 
is reasonable to say that, during the establishment of the new Republic, the military was 
closely tied with politics; in fact, it was serving as a political power. This power had been 
the armed force of the Kemalist revolution, which shaped the foundation of the national 
state and Turkish nationalism. Ataturk explains the role and power of the Turkish military 
in his modernization ideals as follows: 
We are absolutely sure that we will be successful as we rely on a Turkish 
army composed of you in the path of innovation, development and 
civilization we are walking. We will continue to rely on each other and on 
the basis of the will of the nation. The steps our nation has to take are great; 
the targets that are compulsory to access are numerous. Certainly these 
stages will be passed, the most lighted targets will be reached. The sign we 
will give each other for: Forward! Forward! Always ahead! (Ataturk’un 
Soylev ve Demecleri, 2006, p. 234) 
In their bestselling book, Why Nations Fail, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) claim 
that the institutional setting of a country is the key determinant in its prosperity and 
exclusive political institutions can impede socioeconomic innovation. Having served in 
many regions and war fronts of the Ottoman Empire, Ataturk had recognized, first-hand, 
what was lacking in Turkish society and institutions to be a modern state. He had foreseen 
that a radical and swift change was needed to modernize the country. However, every 
change brings resistance, and in the hands of Ataturk, the military was a political power to 
institutionalize the new-born state in a radically modern sense within a very short amount 
of time. 
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Consequently, the modern-day Turkish military takes pride in being the “restless 
followers and guardians” of Ataturk’s principles: Nationalism, Secularism, Republicanism, 
Populism, Statism, and Reformism. 
On the other hand, the Turkish nation was at the center of the Islamic world for 
centuries during the Ottoman era (1299–1923). At the outset of the 20th century, weakened 
by many wars and rebelling nations inside the empire, the Turkish nation found its way to 
survive, led by Ataturk’s western and secular ideals, and it became the Turkish Republic 
in 1923.  
The country is geographically and, to a certain extent, ideologically in the middle 
of the East and the West. Lim (2011) claims that Turkey is a rare example of a nation in 
paradox, with republicanism, Islamism, and secularism all working concordantly within 
the same sociopolitical framework. 
The Turkish nation is almost entirely Muslim. Yet, unlike its many Muslim 
neighbors, Turkey is not ruled by Shari’a law. As pointed out by Ataturk, secularism is one 
of the main principles of the country. This particular “paradox” tends to work as a 
crosscurrent, pulling the Turkish nation in opposite directions.  
According to Lim (2011), when we add the Turkish military to Ataturk’s 
modernization ideals, an inherent source of tension is created. First, the military is tasked 
with defending and guarding Ataturk’s high modernization ideals and principles. On the 
other hand, as the former center and the leader of the Islamic world, in some parts of society 
there is a constant urge to reconcile with the Ottoman legacy. Meanwhile, the military 
always steps forward to guarantee that Turkey is on the modernization path established by 
Ataturk. Consequently, one can say that Ataturk’s founding principles and ideals are the 
heart and soul of the TAF.  
B. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 
Starting from the second half of 1990s, TAF had gone through some structural and 
philosophical changes in terms human resource management. The concept of human 
resource management has been adopted by abandoning classical personnel management. 
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This change in personnel management philosophy was likewise reflected in the structure 
of the TAF’s organization. Human Resource Management Directorates were formed under 
each force’s (Army, Navy, and Air Force) personnel department. 
In the past, recruiting qualified personnel was not an issue for the TAF. On the other 
hand, in recent years, the TAF is having problems meeting its manpower needs in terms of 
both the quantity and quality of recruitment goals. This situation appears to be a direct 
result of economic, social, and demographic changes in Turkey. 
Another development that affects the institutional dynamics of the TAF is the 
evolution of strategic defense management around the globe. When analyzed, strategic 
defense management of nations progresses through three phases. Between two world wars, 
mass armies were the prevailing concept in strategic defense management. During the Cold 
War, threat analysis was the main driver to meet national manpower requirements. After 
the Cold War, a capability-based approach came into prominence.   
Until the end of Cold War, manpower quantity was the dominant force multiplier. 
However, to cope with increasing uncertainty and asymmetric threats in the modern 
security environment, manpower quality has become the most important asset of a military 
force. Thus, a “less crowded, but more qualified army” is a direct product of the shift 
toward what is called the capability-based approach. 
The other issue that must be mentioned here is the shrinking budgets allotted by 
nations for defense efforts. Influenced largely by public pressure, the budget priorities of 
many governments have tended to shift toward education, health, and social welfare. This 
is true for almost all developed and developing nations. This trend also applies to the TAF, 
which has been required to meet the nation’s continuing defense needs with less budget. 
Since personnel expenses constitute a relatively large portion of the TAF’s budget, human 
resource management is under increased pressure to become more cost-effective.  
According to Central Government Budget Law No. 7066, published on December 
31, 2017, and effective from January 01, 2018, the Turkish Ministry of National Defense 
(TMND) was authorized to use a 40 billion, 402 million, 239 thousand TL appropriation 
(Turkish Ministry of National Defense, n.d.). Personnel expenses constitute approximately 
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40 percent of the Turkish Ministry budget, and its distribution economic budget code is 
shown in Table 12.  
Table 12. 2018 FY budget of Turkish Ministry of National Defense 
(1000 units). Adapted from Turkish Ministry of National Defense (n.d.). 
Cost Items TMND Budget in Turkish Lira 




Personnel Expenses 16,501,754 4,377,123 40.8 
Social Security Institution 
Premium Expenses 2.888.833 766,269 7.2 
Goods and Service 
Purchase Expenses 20.329.549 5,392,453 50.3 
Current Transfers 438.255 116,248 1.1 
Capital Expenses 243.848 64,681 0.6 
Total 40,402,239 10,716,774 100.0 
According to Indicative Exchange Rates announced at 15:30 on January 02, 2018 by the Central Bank of 
Turkey, one American dollar equaled to 3,77 Turkish lira (Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, n.d.). 
 
As with any reasonable economic entity, TMND desires to use its allocated 
resources effectively, economically, and in accordance with the law. There are no public 
data to determine draftee costs as a proportion of total personnel costs. Yet, for the purposes 
of the present study, Air Force data are used to calculate individual cost items of a draftee. 
The total cost of a draftee to the nation consists of two cost items. The first is budget 
cost—that is, the total amount of money spent by the Turkish Ministry of Defense for a 
draftee during his compulsory military service. The second is a hidden tax levied on a 
draftee, called the conscription tax, which is a vague cost item and changes according to 
the potential civilian earnings of a draftee.  
Air Force data are used to examine the total budget cost of a draftee for his 
respective 52-week period of service. All data used here were collected from the Logistics 
Department of the Turkish Air Force Command. Every draftee (private or corporal) is 
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trained to serve under a specialization title according to his educational background and 
talents. In the Air Force, these specialization titles include infantry, signal and 
communication (S&C), fortification, ordnance, supply, military band, and air defense. 
Regardless of the specialization title, a draftee’s training consists of two phases: 
initial training (boot camp) and core training. Each training phase is for four weeks; thus, 
in total, a draftee is trained for 8 weeks. For the remaining 44-week service, the cost items 
include allowance, clothing, comestibles, accommodation, medical expenses, and 
personnel costs (administration and training). 
The core training costs vary by the specialization title of the draftee and are shown 
in Table 13. The greatest amount of money is spent on air defense draftees, due to the 
complexity of their training phases. 
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Clothing Food Allowance Accom. Medical Exp. Personnel Total 
Infantry 2242 2271 714 6101 1144 1340 191 15080 24570 29083 8238 
S&C 2242 2234 714 6101 1144 1340 191 15080 24570 29046 8228 
Fortification 2242 2234 714 6101 1144 1340 191 15080 24570 29046 8228 
Ordnance 2242 2234 714 6101 1144 1340 191 15080 24570 29046 8228 
Band 2242 2234 714 6101 1144 1340 191 15080 24570 29046 8228 
Supply 2242 2234 714 6101 1144 1340 191 15080 24570 29046 8228 
Air Defense 2242 8470 714 6101 1144 1340 191 15080 24570 35282 9994 
Adapted from Cost Analysis Department of Turkish Air Force, personal communication, June 7, 2018. 
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After the initial and core training phases, draftees are sent to the units in which they 
will serve for the remaining 44 weeks. The unity maintenance cost for this 44-week term 
is the same, irrespective of the specialization title as shown in Table 13. Therefore, training 
phases differentiate the total costs of a draftee.  
The present study indicates that the average budget cost of a draftee in the Turkish 
Air Force Command is around $8,500 (U.S. dollars) for his 12-month period of compulsory 
service. Due to the lack of data from other Force Commands and the similarity of the tasks 
performed by a draftee in each Force Command, this cost figure can be used for the Army 
and Navy as well. As seen previously in Table 7, the total number of draftees was 288,152 
as of April, 2018. Therefore, the Turkish Ministry of National Defense total budget cost by 
fiscal year for draftees is approximately $2,449,292,000.  
The second cost item is a hidden tax called the conscription tax. During their 
obligatory military service, draftees are leaving their jobs and they are paid relatively little, 
as seen in Table 13, to cover their basic needs during military service. The conscription tax 
is simply the difference between a draftee’s military allowance and his potential earnings 
in civilian life. Obviously, a draftee’s potential civilian earnings will vary according to his 
talents and educational background.  
Owing to very little compensation in the form of allowance, as seen in Table 13, 
the only way for a draftee to shift his utility curve upward is for him to shirk or otherwise 
underperform. Even though a lot of money is spent on the draftees, the current system fails 
to fully incentivize draftees to perform better; by its nature, this system creates an 
inefficient economic environment. It should also be mentioned that removing an otherwise 
highly-motivated young man from his civilian employment levies a cost on that person’s 
civilian employer, who must replace him during his time in service or suffer a consequent 
loss in productivity. In a larger sense, the accumulated loss of productivity among civilian 
employers ultimately affects the nation, as well. 
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C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter IV sought to understand the social and economic implications of military 
service in Turkey. TAF’s position within the nation is clearly strong; it is both highly 
trusted and admired as an institution by the Turkish public. These positive public attitudes 
toward the military within Turkish society are shaped largely by two significant factors: 
the military-nation phenomenon and Ataturk’s enduring influence as founder of the modern 
Turkish Republic.  
Ataturk is a symbol and sets a benchmark for the Turkish military and the latter 
finds honor regarding itself as the guardian of Ataturk’s high-esteemed modernization 
principles. Given that “secularism” is one of the main principles of Ataturk and being a 
nation almost entirely Muslim with a six-hundred-year Ottoman legacy of being a leader 
of the Islamic world, Turkey is in a unique position geographically and partly ideologically 
in the middle of the East and the West. In this paradoxical situation, the military is tasked 
to ensure that the country stays on the modernization path enlightened by Ataturk. 
The second part of this chapter examined the TAF’s shrinking budget and the 
estimated financial cost of the universal draft. The study determined that the total cost of a 
draftee to the nation consists mainly of two items: actual budget outlays and the 
conscription tax, a hidden cost levied on the draftee. Consequently, paid military service 
can operate to reduce these costs for those who buy out of their compulsory military 
service, particularly for men who are employed in the civilian sector and can easily afford 
the exemption fee. At the same time, paid military service provides a revenue stream for 
the national budget from exemption fees. As shown previously (Chapter III), revenue from 
paid exemption fees in 2018 totaled nearly $2 billion (U.S. dollars). 
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V. EVALUATION OF PAID MILITARY SERVICE EXEMPTION 
IN TURKEY 
The chapter utilizes the Population Representation Model (PRM) framework 
introduced by Eitelberg (1979) to assess paid military service exemptions in Turkey. 
Following the PRM, the present study evaluates paid military service using three criteria: 
political legitimacy, social equity, and military effectiveness. 
A. POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 
Taking into account the “paradoxical” nature of Turkey discussed previously 
(Chapter IV), it is clear that the legitimacy of the military and military service should 
periodically undergo a thorough questioning process. Further, considering the military-
nation phenomenon in Turkey, it is both important and necessary to examine every corner 
of daily life without limiting legitimacy to the larger, national context. Every Turkish 
citizen has a say—in either approving or disapproving—a citizen’s right and responsibility 
to serve in the military and undoubtedly about paid military service exemptions.  
The concept of citizen-armies and the application of compulsory military service 
came into play with the French revolution. To solidify nationalism or strong patriotic 
sentiments within citizens, the Turkish nation also applied conscription widely and 
reinforced popular approval with indoctrination in schools. The Turkish student oath is a 
very good example of this indoctrination, although some Kurdish politicians in Turkey 
have opposed the oath. Other countries use similar forms of indoctrination in schools, such 
as the Pledge of Allegiance in the United States and the singing of patriotic songs or the 
national anthem at sporting events. Additionally, apart from defending the country, the 
Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) are seen to serve as a “citizenship academy” for draftees.  
 With the help of compulsory military service, the responsibility for the security 
and defense of the Turkish nation lies with the larger Turkish population, without any 
discrimination between the eastern or western regions, rich or poor, educated or 
uneducated, and Kurdish or Turkish. It is important to note that approximately 20 percent 
of Turkey’s population is Kurdish according to data from the U.S. Central Intelligence 
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Agency (n.d.). They reside mostly in eastern or southeastern parts of Turkey and, in many 
cases, they serve in the western and economically more developed parts of Turkey. In this 
way, it is plausible to say that Turkey’s universal draft creates an atmosphere that 
strengthens citizenship ties and a sense of shared purpose, especially for members of 
differing demographic groups in the young Turkish male population. 
As mentioned in Chapter IV, some rhetorical and historical consolidators operate 
to solidify the Turkish nation’s willing acceptance of universal service for men. One of 
these is the popular myth of the military-nation and historical acts of heroism, along with 
Ataturk’s positive effects. Given that nearly every person in Turkey is Muslim, military 
service is seen as a sacred duty and being martyred for the country is perceived as a highly-
esteemed honor. The plethora of war memorials throughout Turkey and memorial 
ceremonies for those who lost their lives when serving reinforce popular sentiment about 
military heroism and sacrifice for one’s country. 
At the same time, there is also a material aspect of legitimizing military service 
within the nation, such as some social rights and privileges provided exclusively for those 
who serve in the military. These privileges apply mostly for the professional, career-
oriented components of the Turkish military. As seen previously in Table 13, draftees are 
required to leave their civilian job while being paid very little for their basic needs during 
compulsory military service. For draftees, the material aspect of persuading them to serve 
in the military is based in part on avoidance of punishment. As previously discussed in 
Chapter II, draft evaders can face harsh penalties, and the mere threat of these penalties 
may be enough to stimulate compliance. 
In basic psychology, such avoidance of a negative outcome on the part of potential 
draftees could be called negative reinforcement; that is, the potential draftee may see 
compulsory service as an unnecessary burden on his young life, yet he complies due to a 
strong fear of an aversive outcome (incarceration). Perceptions of compulsory service as a 
personal burden have likely strengthened over the recent past because of two 
socioeconomic trends, mainly an increased emphasis on individualism and greater 
awareness of economic rationality. Some years ago, the TAF could rely more heavily on 
notions of heroism, sacrifice, patriotism, and the presumed male rite of passage, along with 
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the social rewards (positive reinforcement) associated with fulfilling one’s military 
obligation. Apparently, according to survey research reported in Chapter II, opinions of 
compulsory military service have changed considerably, where a majority may see adverse 
consequences on the careers of draftees and just half agree that compulsory service is an 
“essential process.” Perhaps the best evidence of changing public opinions of compulsory 
service can be seen in the number of young men who took advantage of the most recent 
paid exemption in 2018: 730,775, nearly double the number of paid exemptions under the 
previous five temporary laws (see Table 10).  
A general finding here is that the legitimacy of compulsory military service could 
be eroding across segments of the Turkish population, particularly among younger, 
military-eligible young men. Additionally, Torun and Tumen (2016) find evidence to 
suggest that paid military service correlates with a decline in labor income. The net effect 
would be shifting support for a military system in which only career-oriented professionals 
serve.  
At the same time, one could say that temporary laws enacted to allow paid military 
service are considered legitimate. And, by extension, these laws are essentially at odds with 
the principle of universal military service, where all eligible and qualified persons must 
serve, since they allow otherwise eligible men to buy their way out of the obligation to 
serve. Several times after the 1980s, draft-eligible men had the option to purchase a paid 
exemption from compulsory military service. Since paid military service has been initiated 
in Turkish history by several governments with different political objectives (i.e., 
Nationalist, center-right, and center-left), there is little doubt regarding the perceived 
legitimacy of this act. 
With the introduction of the most recent temporary paid military service exemption 
law at the end of 2018, the TAF lost more than twice the current draftee population. 
Eligibility was based on being born before January 1, 1994. Thus, the men who were born 
before this date were eligible, whereas men born on January 1, 1994 or thereafter were 
ineligible. Thus, if this exemption law were introduced without a cut-off age, the total 
figure should have been much larger, showing that compulsory military service has lost 
public approval and paid military service is legitimate and approved by many. 
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This seeming legitimacy comes with a risk that can create irreversible political 
fallout. During the past four decades, thousands of TAF personnel and innocent Turkish 
citizens have lost their lives by guerilla attacks of the terrorist organization PKK, which 
has a main objective of establishing a new-state, a “so-called Kurdistan,” in the Turkish 
borders. The militants of PKK are largely born in the eastern and southeastern parts of 
Turkey, where the Kurdish population is concentrated. Generally, they have a poor 
educational background and they join the PKK terrorist organization at very young ages 
before being drafted to serve in the TAF. It is highly likely that these militants are TAF 
draft evaders. Taking into account the age distribution of PKK militants (see Figure 4), 
candidate draft evaders can easily buy out of their military service, thus affecting the 
population representativeness of the Turkish nation in the TAF. 
Additionally, it should be noted that establishing a compensation fee for military 
service is very controversial. Based on historical data, it would be easy to calculate a 
casualty rate for military service to determine the associated risks to be shared among 
Turkish citizens. Yet, it is not right to calculate the value of someone’s life and then express 
it in monetary terms. Even though paid military service laws are politically legitimate and 
apparently enjoy high public approval, they can also be viewed as being morally 
objectionable. Thus, there is no universally convincing and acceptable way to find a 
breakeven point to compensate for military service. 
B. MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS 
The mission of the TAF is to defend Turkey against external and internal risks and 
threats. The Turkish Republic uses the universal draft to preserve efficient and adequate 
military manpower in accordance with The Turkish Recruitment Act of 1927. Article 89 
of the Turkish Recruitment Act (1927) defines both draft evasion and desertion as crimes, 
and these violations are liable to harsh punishment according to the Turkish Military Penal 
Code (1930).  
As seen in Table 13, a draftee was paid annually only 1,144 TL ($324 in US dollars) 
in FY2017 for his basic needs during his military service. But, in FY2017, the minimum 
monthly wage for an employee in the Turkish civilian economy was $502, as shown in 
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Table 11. Therefore, the foregone earnings of even the least-educated and talented draftee, 
who would be making minimum wage in the civilian sector, are substantial. 
Due to very limited compensation, the only way to shift the draftee’s utility curve 
upward is for him to shirk or underperform. There is no way for a draftee to increase his 
salary when drafted. Thus, in most cases, a draftee opts out for less labor and more leisure 
at any given chance. That is, the current draft system fails to incentivize draftees to perform 
at a level commensurate with their ability.  
On the other hand, the average budget cost of a draftee in the Turkish Armed Forces 
Command is around $8,500 for his 12-month compulsory service, as seen in Table 13. This 
budget cost for each draftee includes training, clothing, food, accommodations, medical 
expenses, and allowance. As seen previously in Table 7, the total number of draftees was 
288,152 as of April 2018. Therefore, the Turkish Ministry of National Defense (TMND) 
total budget cost by fiscal year for draftees is approximately $2,449,292,000. One can 
understand the magnitude of this total budget cost for draftees given that the TMND was 
authorized by the Turkish government to use an appropriation of $10,716,774,000 (Turkish 
Ministry of National Defense, 2018). 
Effective defense efforts require two core components: quality manpower and 
effective usage of the shrinking defense budget allotted by the nation. A talented, task-
oriented, and highly qualified military corps is required to change the security environment. 
According to facts and figures provided above, a main premise of effective national defense 
is violated in having a universal draft system. That is, the shrinking defense budget is not 
being used effectively, and the quality and motivation of manpower is suffering due to a 
lack of proper compensation for draftees. Consequently, by its very nature, the universal 
draft creates an inefficient environment.  
Apart from the lack of compensation for draftees, the relatively low quality of 
enlistees stems from the limited screening process when drafting.  The call period for 
conscription starts on the first January of the year when young male citizens reach the age 
of 20 years. Under the responsibility of the conscription offices throughout Turkey, 
necessary information is provided to candidate-draftees within that year. The recruitment 
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system necessitates that all male Turkish citizens above the age of 20—with good medical 
and psychological health and within acceptable Body Mass Index (BMI) values—enlist in 
the TAF (The Turkish Recruitment Act, 1927).  
The total manpower end-strength of the Army, Navy, and Air Force was 464,392 
as of April 2018. The total number of draftees was 288,152, which amounts to 62 percent 
of the total end-strength. Owing to limited screening of draftees and the compulsory 
conscription of all young men from every walk of life, the worst elements of Turkish 
society are serving within the draftee population. Second, considering that incoming 
draftees arrive in batches every three months for their twelve-month period of service, 
turnover rates are relatively huge in the TAF. As a result, management problems caused by 
draftees often arise and have adverse consequences on the effectiveness of the TAF. 
Abolishing the draft system and switching to an all-volunteer force may eradicate 
the inefficient use of budget resources and assist in efforts to increase the quality of 
enlistees, thereby improving the overall effectiveness of the TAF. The paid exemption laws 
can be viewed as a significant step toward increasing the proportion of professionals, thus 
enhancing the military effectiveness of the Turkish military. 
Based on temporary laws enacted several times after the 1980s, eligible men were 
given the option to purchase their exemption from compulsory military service. The most 
recent paid military service exemption law (August 2018) offered a buyout costing $2,700 
to young men born before January 1, 1994.  
In comparing the various paid military service exemptions laws, the most recent 
law had the cheapest paid military service exemption at $2,700 and, by far, the greatest 
number of participants (“Bedelli Askerlik,” 2018). To be able to understand the real value 
of $2,700 for a Turkish citizen—thus the monetary sacrifice of participants—it must be 
noted again that the minimum monthly wage for employees in the civilian sector was $364 
in November, 2018 (see Table 11). This means that the buyout amount would be 
approximately equal to compensation for just over seven months of work in the civilian 
sector for a young man earning the minimum wage. In essence, then, the buyout would 
amount to a trade of no more than seven months (by a minimally qualified worker in the 
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civilian sector) for an obligation of 6 or 12 months, depending on one’s education and 
qualifications, in the TAF. 
Possible implications of paid military service for the effectiveness of the TAF are 
discussed below. Two important areas are addressed: the quality and quantity of TAF 
members and the defense budget. 
1. The Quality and Quantity of Enlistees 
As discussed previously, before the Cold War concluded, military manpower 
quantity was the dominant force multiplier. A nation’s defense capabilities were 
determined largely by the size or end-strength of its armed forces as well as the number 
and type of its armaments. However, to cope with increasing uncertainty, asymmetric 
threats, and remarkable changes in defense technology, it became clear that a military’s 
strength and ultimate effectiveness depended largely on the quality, training, and 
experience of its human resources. Consequently, after the Cold War, modern militaries 
found that effectiveness, in terms of both financial costs and performance, could be 
improved significantly by reducing end-strength and relying more heavily on the talents of 
their most highly-qualified members. The increased focus on personnel quality over 
quantity also led to a greater dependence of modern militaries on careerists or experienced 
professionals, as these militaries sought to reduce their manpower turnover.   
Despite the worldwide trend toward professional armies, Turkey, which has 
NATO’s second-largest military, is one of few countries that still rely on a universal draft 
for its manpower needs. Every year, in batches, thousands of young men are compelled to 
enlist for 6-12 months of what is called “national service” by the Turkish constitution. 
Turkey’s defense requirements set it apart from other countries and necessitate that 
it employ a relatively large military force. Clearly, four decades of PKK terrorism have 
taken a toll on the Turkish economy, while thousands of TAF personnel have been 
martyred through guerilla attacks. At the same time, according to many prominent Turkish 
scholars and journalists, these large losses of TAF personnel stem partly from the high 
percentage of TAF’s nonprofessional component. 
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As mentioned previously in Chapter II, Turkey’s universal draft has created a less 
efficient military environment due to limited screening of draftees, high personnel turnover 
rates, motivational issues, and various management problems caused by conscripting large 
numbers of young men from diverse backgrounds. 
Additionally, temporary paid military service exemption laws are far from curing 
the inefficiency problem in the TAF and may harm the quality of draftees. With the very 
recent exemption law of 2018, more than 700,000 possible draftees bought their way out 
of military service in return for a payment of $2,700. The only restriction was that they 
needed to be born before January 1, 1994 (age 25 years or older). Interestingly, the cutoff 
age of 25 in the 2018 law is the youngest of the six temporary military exemption laws 
instituted since 1987 (see Table 10). At the same, it is noteworthy that all of the temporary 
exemption laws are focused on older men who have likely postponed fulfilling their 
military service obligation for educational purposes. 
Recall from Chapter II, the Turkey’s system requires that all male Turkish citizens 
above the age of 20 years—with good medical and psychological health—serve in the 
TAF. If the draft-liable citizen enrolls in college or continues his education, he can defer 
his military responsibility until the age of 29. As it turns out, people who are born between 
the January 1, 1994 and January 1, 1999 are draft-liable without any opportunity for paid 
military service under the 2018 temporary law. In this sense, then, even though more than 
700,000 potential draftees took advantage of paid military service, the TAF will not be 
greatly affected in terms of meeting personnel numbers in the near future.  
Nevertheless, the quality of enlistees could suffer greatly with this temporary paid 
military service exemption act. Those eligible for paid exemption were the draft-liable men 
with higher education who were born before the cutoff age of 25 years. Under Turkish law, 
they were permitted to defer their military obligation until the age of 29 by attending 
college or pursuing a higher degree. One obvious outcome of restricting the buyout 
provision to older men is that it correspondingly drains the pool of potential draftees with 
higher education. This will reduce the average education of men in subsequent enlistment 
cohorts to an undetermined extent. It will also eliminate some number of highly educated, 
older men who would bring the benefits of emotional maturity, greater life experiences, 
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and analytical ability to military jobs in which they are assigned. On the other hand, some 
of these older, well-educated men may be less-motivated draftees and underperform 
purposely when placed in positions that do not challenge their ability. Further, older 
draftees may not be as physically fit or capable to perform arduous tasks or serve on 
difficult deployments away from their family, particularly if they have dependents. Yet, all 
of the potential advantages of having smart, well-educated military personnel in the draftee 
corps would seem to outweigh the assumed disadvantages. Older, well-educated, highly 
capable draftees can be especially important in helping to counsel and guide younger men 
as well in displaying good leadership ability and judgment in difficult situations. 
2. The Usage of Defense Budget 
According to Central Government Budget Law No. 7066, published on December 
31, 2017, and effective on January 1, 2018, the Turkish Ministry of National Defense 
(TMND) was authorized an appropriation of $10,716,774,000 (Turkish Ministry of 
National Defense, 2018). In this budget, as shown in Table 12 (Chapter IV), 
$4,377,123,000 is allotted for total personnel expenses (including the expenses of both the 
professional and nonprofessional components of the TAF).  
As seen in Table 13 (Chapter IV), the average budget cost of a draftee for 12 months 
of service in the Turkish Air Force Command is approximately $8,500. Due to a lack of 
data from other Force Commands, and assuming that the tasks performed by a draftee in 
each Force Command are roughly the same, this cost figure is applied to the Army and 
Navy, as well. Table 7 (Chapter III) shows that the total number of draftees as of April 
2018 was 288,152. Based on these figures, the TMND total budget cost for draftees in a 
fiscal year can be calculated as being approximately $2,449,292,000. 
Table 10 (Chapter III) shows that total revenue from the military service exemption 
law of April 2018 amounts to $1,973,092,500. Revenue from this exemption law helps to 
offset most of the budgetary costs of draftees during the same timeframe, yet it still leaves 
an expense of about $476 million for draftees. Based on the unprecedented popularity of 
the exemption offer and its relatively low fee (nearly one-third of the required exemption 
fee in 2014, 1999, 1992, and 1987), it appears that further econometric analysis could 
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reveal an increased revenue fee that would attract enough participants to fully recover the 
budgetary costs of draftees or even provide the TMND with a budgetary surplus. A simple 
calculation, for example, indicates that increasing the fee to $3,500, under a similar law, 
would offset the budgetary costs of draftees if 700,000 men (somewhat fewer than in 2018) 
opted to participate.  
If the objective is to raise revenue, reduce the draft-eligible pool, or achieve a 
combination of both, it seems that the experience of 2018 would be a good starting point 
to determine a more optimally effective exemption fee and perhaps increase participation 
by lowering the age limitation. Obviously, as required fees rise, participation would 
decline; and, lowering the age of eligibility would give more men the opportunity to 
participate, counteracting that decline. With further analysis and comparison of 
experiences in 2011, 2014, and 2018—along with added information from surveys of the 
target population and data on selected economic variables—one could calculate projected 
participation with different required fees, eligibility criteria, and socioeconomic or civilian 
employment conditions (motivators or constraints to participate) in Turkey.  
C. SOCIAL EQUITY 
Since the first ancient civilizations, an ideal state has been defined as one where 
citizens could maximize their well-being. Yet, there is also a very costly burden to be 
shared to maximize the well-being of all citizens, and that is military service. The mission 
of the TAF, according to the Constitution (1982), is “to defend Turkey against risks and 
threats from abroad, [and to] preserve efficient and adequate deterrence capabilities by 
reinforcing military power” (p. 23).  
Military service must be free of any racial, economic, or social discrimination, and 
the benefits and burdens of military service should be shared equally among different 
segments of Turkish society. Although there may be concerns about the effectiveness of 
the military from time to time, Turkey’s universal draft helps to ensure that social equity 
is achieved in distributing the benefits and burdens fairly within the nation’s male 
population. In Turkish daily discourse, references to a person’s “sacred duty” are 
commonly associated with this system of compulsory military service. For centuries, the 
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most important citizenship duty of a Turkish male citizen has been his military service and 
patriotic responsibility to protect and defend his country.  
 “Who serves when not all serve?” The Marshall Commission in the United States 
sought to answer to this question in 1967, during a period when U.S. military conscription 
was particularly active in supporting a major conflict. The Commission released a final 
report with its findings, and a main guiding principle was that the burdens of serving in the 
military must be shared equally between different groups of society (Eitelberg, 1979).  
The issue of shared sacrifice is not one of practical concern for Turkey. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that paid military service exemption laws tend to favor those 
who can both afford to postpone their military obligation through higher education and pay 
the required fee. As noted previously, eligibility under the temporary laws is based on a 
man’s age. In the most recent law, participation was limited to men who were at least 25 
years old, meaning that they had postponed their obligation by pursuing higher education 
or training. For most of these older men, a fee of $2,700 may have seemed like a bargain, 
thus explaining the relatively high rate of participation. In this application of the law, 
inequities based affordability were probably minimal, especially when the age, education, 
occupational training, and working experience of these men are taken into account. 
However, a young man’s ability to postpone his military obligation until the age of 25 or 
older suggests that these men are more economically or socially advantaged segment than 
many younger men.  
Paid military service was allowed when the U.S. introduced its first national draft 
during the American Civil War in the 1860s. This provision contributed to a popular view 
that the war was being fought with “rich men’s money and poor men’s blood” (Eitelberg, 
1979). Subsequent draft laws in the U.S. did not provide for paid military service, yet other 
aspects these draft laws tended to discriminate among young men based on their 
socioeconomic status (Eitelberg, 1979). This type of inequity in the military draft is 
common historically and embedded in most systems of compulsory that are selective, not 
universal. Even in in Turkey, with its longstanding system of universal military service, 
some folksongs speak about this unjust situation: 
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The road to Yemen is full of graves; soldiers’ food is in copper plates. 
Our riches do give the money; our soldiers are of the poor. (Coskun, 2014) 
On its own, the age limitation in Turkish military exemption laws could be called a 
form of “age discrimination.” The six temporary laws described previously (see Table 10) 
have restricted eligibility to men from the age of at least 40 (in the 1987 law), at least 29 
(2011), at least 27 (1992, 1999, and 2014), to at least 25 (2018). Universal service is based 
on the fundamental principle that all citizens share equally—and universally—in serving 
their country. For practical reasons, universal service in the military may be confined to 
citizens deemed qualified to serve based on criteria established by law. In Turkey, these 
criteria include men only between the ages of 20 and 41 years. Yet, none of the temporary 
military exemption laws mentioned above has provided the buyout privilege to a man under 
the age of 25. As a result, the temporary laws discriminate purposely according to age, and 
the reason for doing so likely places the demands of military effectiveness above those of 
social equity.  A less obvious effect of the temporary exemption laws, and likely 
unintentional, is that they tend to reward men who have postponed their military obligation.   
The age limitation can also be deemed a contradiction of Article 10 of the Turkish 
Constitution (1982), which establishes the principle of “equality before the law.” As stated: 
Everyone is equal before the law regardless of language, race, color, sex, 
political thought, philosophical belief, religion, sect or similar reasons. No 
one person, family, group or class shall be granted privilege. State organs 
and administrative authorities shall act in accordance with the principle of 
“equality before the law” in all their proceedings. 
According to this principle, the mere fact that the exemption privilege is temporary 
and offered by the government only on an as-needed basis means that some young men 
born in certain years will be granted the opportunity of paid military service while others 
will not.  Further, the timing, cut-off ages, and amount of the exemption fee have varied 
over the past 30 years, so young men in the draft-liable pool would have no way of knowing 
in advance if they would be among those who could someday pay an exemption fee. Clearly 
this situation affects how these men plan their future after the age of 20.  
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
According to some vocal Turkish scholars and journalists, large losses of TAF 
personnel fighting against PKK stem partly from the high percentage of TAF’s 
nonprofessional component, given that draftees constitute 62 percent of TAF’s end-
strength as of April 2018.  The introduction of the Contracting Private Act (Code 6191) in 
2011 was an attempt toward increasing the professional component of the TAF; even 
though expectations were high, demand was low for these positions (See Chapter III, Table 
6). The introduction of paid military service adds another source of tension to this unsettled 
approach toward strengthening professionalism and, simultaneously, the desire to increase 
manpower quality. The age limitations used in paid exemption acts (e.g., 25 or older in 
2018) likely reduce the average educational attainment of draftees, given that deferments 
for conscription are only available if one is pursuing a further degree. In this sense, paid 
exemptions are far from curing the inefficiency problem caused by a universal draft.  
Turkey’s laws and policy governing paid military service are deemed legitimate 
because they have been implemented by various governments with differing political 
positions over time. They also seem to enjoy general public approval from a population 
that rates the military high as a trusted institution. Additionally, the exemption programs 
have been popular, as evidenced by high levels of participation by eligible men. Yet, this 
presumed legitimacy comes with a risk that can lead to unintended negative consequences 
in the continuing struggle against the PKK. Paid military service could be exploited as a 
legitimate path for some Kurdish draft evaders. Further, paid military service could affect 
the representation of various demographic groups (including the Kurdish population) 
within the TAF, the consequences of which are speculative at best. 
Paid military exemption programs could be made more effective through 
refinements aimed at increasing revenues while still meeting other manpower policy 
objectives. One possible issue, still requiring further study, is the long-term consequence 
of targeting older men in the draft-eligible pool. The loss of older, more highly educated 
draftees with valuable life skills and experiences could have a lasting, negative effect on 
the TAF.  
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Finally, the paid military exemption programs could be viewed as unfair or 
inequitable based on their eligibility requirements and selective targeting of older men who 
have postponed fulfilling their military obligation. If the opportunity to buy out of one’s 
military obligation is viewed as a privilege, one could argue that it discriminates in various 
ways when limited to men who are older, more educated, and possibly have higher 
socioeconomic status. Further, the targeting of older groups in the exemption programs 
rewards draft-liable men who have postponed meeting their obligation and may actually 
encourage such behavior as a result.  
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis includes five previous chapters that explore Turkey's compulsory 
military service and whether the Turkish government should continue to offer the option 
of paying a specified fee to be exempt from service. After an introduction, Chapter II 
provides background and briefly reviews literature related to paid military service 
exemptions in Turkey. Chapter III examines how recent developments in Turkey affect 
paid military service, followed by Chapter IV, which focuses on the potential social and 
economic implications. Chapter V then takes a broader view, evaluating paid military 
service exemptions in Turkey based on the “Population Representation Model” (PRM). 
Chapter VI now presents a summary, conclusions of the study, and recommendations for 
further research. 
A. SUMMARY 
This study examines paid military service, a policy that allows some men to 
purchase an exemption from the universal draft in Turkey, using the PRM, introduced 
originally by M. J. Eitelberg in 1979.  Three “legs”—social equity, political legitimacy, 
and military effectiveness—support the PRM. The present study seeks to measure the 
strength or stability of each leg as it relates to paid military service in Turkey; in other 
words, whether current paid military service laws fulfill the desired objectives of Turkish 
policy makers and whether these laws may result in unintended consequences that could 
ultimately counteract expected outcomes. 
Eitelberg’s (1979) original model operates in a qualitative domain, rather than a 
quantitative one, and it shapes the perspective of the present study by providing clear, 
universally applicable criteria for assessing Turkey’s military draft policy. More 
specifically, the general approach seeks to examine Turkey’s paid military service 
exemptions in terms of social equity, political legitimacy, and military effectiveness. To 
do so, the study explores the economic and social implications of the policy in Turkey, 
focusing on relations between the Turkish military and society. Additionally, the study 
assesses the policy using cost-benefit analysis with limited, publicly available data. 
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The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have a rich and impressive history that dates 
back to 209 BC and is strongly connected with the Turkish national identity. Indeed, the 
Turkish people have often referred to their homeland as a military-nation throughout 
history. In fact, even now, nationalism and militarism are frequently intertwined in Turkish 
political and cultural discourse. The common expression, “every Turk is a soldier,” 
captures this shared view among Turkish citizens. 
Apart from this shared historical sentiment, a more recent experience is still 
relatively fresh in the mind of every Turkish citizen, demonstrating the critical role of the 
TAF in creating the modern-day Turkish Republic. After the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire at the dawn of twentieth century, having fought many battles and lost its vast lands 
in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, the poor and war-torn Turkish nation was fortunate 
to have Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, a heroic military leader who established a national state 
in Anatolia in 1923. Beyond being an inspirational military figure, Ataturk was a 
transformational statesman. Over the remnants of the Ottoman Empire, Ataturk started a 
revolutionary period toward institutionalizing a western, secular, national state. Unlike the 
French revolution, which was triggered with the support of the greater masses, the Turkish 
revolution was directed from top to bottom. Being an ex-Ottoman officer himself, Ataturk 
ensured that the Turkish military would be a critically important political force. The 
present-day Turkish military still takes pride in being the “restless followers and guardians” 
of Ataturk’s modernization ideals and principles.  As discussed in Chapter IV, the TAF’s 
strong bond with the nation helped to make it the “most trusted institution” in the country 
during past years. 
As discussed in Chapter II, the TAF uses a universal draft of its male population to 
meet its manpower needs in accordance with the Turkish Recruitment Act (1927). 
Compulsory military service is typically looked upon as an unpleasant, although necessary, 
duty by citizens in many nations, since it is essentially involuntary and entails a forced 
period of separation from civilian life. Yet, in Turkey, as explained in Chapter IV, 
compulsory military service has been regarded as a sacred duty and a unifying patriotic 
experience as well as a male rite of passage. 
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Engin (2016) claims that “the present draft system may have adverse consequences 
for the effectiveness of the Turkish military” (p. 97). Further, Engin presents three main 
reasons to support his claim: the relatively low quality of enlistees, high personnel turnover 
rates, and manpower management problems. In another study, Akyurek and Yilmaz (2013) 
employed a survey to determine the perceptions of Turkish citizens about compulsory 
military service. The researchers found a prominent view concerning the negative effects 
of compulsory military service along with a significant desire for change.  
Drawing heavily upon an economically rational type of thinking after the 1980s, 
Turkey has initiated paid military service exemption laws a total of six times (see Chapter 
III, Table 10). Since these paid military service laws have been enacted by several 
governments with differing political positions (and by coalition governments), one can 
conclude that the basic premise and objectives of such laws are considered legitimate by a 
majority of the nation’s citizens (Onbaşı, 2016). As observed in Chapter II, conscientious 
objection to being drafted is prohibited in Turkey. According to Onbaşı (2016), “the 
concept of conscientious objection puts a spoke in the wheel, [while] … paid military 
service steps in to fix it” (p. 884). At the same time, some studies have focused on the 
education and labor-market outcomes of paid military service in Turkey, but no previous 
research has taken into account the overall political, social, and military outcomes of the 
exemption laws. Consequently, existing literature on paid military service exemptions in 
Turkey lacks a “grand-scheme analysis” as discussed in Chapter II. 
One must first understand the devastating outcomes of the fight against the Kurdish 
Separatist Group-PKK to make an informed judgment about the possible effects of paid 
exemption policies. Turkey has struggled with terrorism by PKK militants for nearly four 
decades. As noted in Chapter V, 20 percent of Turkey’s population is Kurdish. Further, as 
shown in Figure 4, PKK militants tend to have relatively low educational attainment, and 
they usually join the PKK at a very early age, before they are drafted to serve in the corps 
of TAF. Beyond defending the country, with the help compulsory military service, the TAF 
serves as a sort of “citizenship academy” in Turkey by strengthening the ties of draftees 
from different ethnic and educational backgrounds. Paid military service, depending on its 
eligibility criteria and comparative use by different groups across the Turkish population, 
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may diminish the “citizenship academy” role of the TAF by changing the balance or mix 
of draftees in the TAF, particularly among the Kurdish population. 
Another factor to consider in assessing paid military service is the attempted coup 
by a faction of the TAF on July 15, 2016 with an aim of overthrowing the ruling 
government. The coup attempt failed, but during the clashes in several Turkish cities, 240 
citizens died and 500 citizens were wounded in one night. As discussed in Chapter III, 
thousands of TAF personnel were expelled or imprisoned for taking part in the attempted 
coup or being associated with the faction that plotted it. The coup attempt apparently 
damaged public opinion of the TAF. In a nationwide survey of the adult population 
conducted in August 2016, for example, the TAF ranked seventh as a “most trusted 
institution” in the country, falling from first place just a year before. The 2016 coup attempt 
marked the first time in Turkish history that Turkish citizens bore arms against their own 
military to defend the country.  Considering the damaged bonds of the TAF with society, 
the creation of a permanent paid exemption law could have unintended negative 
consequences and perhaps even lead to further alienation of the TAF from the nation. 
On August 3, 2018, the ruling government introduced a paid military service act 
with an exemption fee of $2,700 and a cut-off age of 25, meaning that eligibility was based 
on being born before January 1, 1994. As seen in Chapter III (Table 10), the 2018 
exemption act established the lowest cut-off age as well as the lowest price of exemption 
in Turkish history. As a result, more than 700,000 Turkish men bought out of their 
compulsory military service, and the total revenue collected was nearly $2 billion (U.S. 
dollars).  
The high participation of men in the recent paid exemption act is attributed mostly 
to the relatively affordable fee and lower cut-off age. Nevertheless, a number of observers 
view the surge of interest among young men in buying their way out of the draft as a 
possible indicator that compulsory military is losing its public acceptance or legitimacy 
within Turkish society. As discussed in Chapter IV, compulsory military service has been 
a part of the nation’s social fabric for many years, celebrated as a normal phase of a young 
man’s life and his transition to full-citizenship. This long-held, widely accepted status of 
compulsory service in society may be fading away with the integration of the Turkish 
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economy into global capitalism, resulting in a greater emphasis on economic rationality. 
Assuming this is correct, one could argue that some degree of compliance by draft-eligible 
young men is due to the perceived negative outcomes of non-compliance on a draft 
evader’s future, including the legal penalties and social stigma that follow. Indeed, without 
the option of paid military service, the only voluntary aspect of compulsory (mandatory) 
service is voluntary compliance (see Chapter II). 
As noted above, evidence strongly suggests that paid military service is perceived 
throughout Turkey as generally legitimate. The only areas of concern regarding the 
legitimacy of paid exemptions relate to the specific details of the policy, such as the cost 
of buying out or the cut-off age. Indeed, the cut-off age is seen by some as a possible 
violation of the national principle, “equality before the law.” That is, because the privilege 
of buying one’s way out of compulsory service is limited to older-age cohorts, men in these 
cohorts may be getting special treatment at the expense of their younger peers. 
Additionally, since the minimum age limit is set at 25 in the 2018 law, one could argue that 
the buy-out provision favors men who were able to postpone their military service by 
pursuing higher education. In this way, the higher age limitation may also favor those who 
have the socioeconomic background, ambition, academic preparation, and means to seek 
higher education. 
Cut-off ages and exemption fees are set according to the needs of the Turkish 
Ministry of National Defense, but both of these eligibility requirements can clearly favor 
certain segments of the male population over others. The lower the exemption fee, the less 
likely it will favor young men who are more economically privileged. On the other hand, 
if the price of buying one’s way out of service is relatively steep, as it was in the 2011 
exemption act (see Chapter III, Table 10), one could say that it violates not only the 
principle of “equality before the law” but the basic premise of “universal” military service 
for Turkish men. In contrast, and to its credit and popularity, the exemption fee in the 2018 
act was approximately 7.42 times the minimum wage in Turkey (see Table 11), considered 
rather “affordable” across the national population.   
Torun and Tumen (2015) studied the effects of paid military service on education 
and labor market outcomes, finding a 0.15–0.20 year reduction in total years of education 
70 
completed due to the decreased incentives to continue further education. Thus, it can be 
inferred that the socioeconomically advantaged segment of society is deferring military 
service by pursuing further education, possibly with the hope obtaining a paid exemption 
in the future (based on the fact that exemption acts have been periodically enacted over the 
past decade; see Chapter III, Table 10). Consequently, exclusion of these higher-educated, 
otherwise draft-eligible men from military service may substantially reduce manpower 
quality and therefore the overall effectiveness of the TAF. This would be especially 
apparent under a larger-scale exemption act, as applied in 2018. 
In sum, the present study finds evidence that paid exemption acts tend to place 
raising revenue over social equity. Recalling the ethnic distribution of Turkey, the paid 
military service option, depending on its eligibility requirements and other provisions, can 
adversely affect population representativeness in the TAF. Moreover, purposely draining 
the draft-eligible pool of men with higher educational attainment may ultimately harm the 
effectiveness of the Turkish military corps. In this sense, it might be better if Turkey stops 
offering the option of paid exemption based on temporary laws. If the sole aim is to 
compensate for the budgetary costs of draftees, further econometric analysis can reveal the 
optimal exemption fee and cut-off age. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Turkey is one of few countries that still rely on a universal draft for their manpower 
needs. Backed by capitalist ideas, and with a strong emphasis on economic rationality, 
several different ruling governments in Turkey with their own distinctive political positions 
have introduced the option of buying out of military service. The most recent exemption 
act was in 2018. The present study evaluated paid military service in Turkey using a 
“population representation model.” 
The following research questions are addressed to refine the thesis statement.  
Primary Research Question: 
Should the Turkish government offer the option of paying a certain fee to be exempt 
from compulsory military service? 
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Secondary Research Questions: 
1. Is paid military service an effective method for staffing the Turkish 
military and meeting the nation’s defense needs?  
2. Is paid military service fair? 
3. Does paid military service follow the established principles of Turkey’s 
constitutional government, and does it have popular approval? 
Before starting this research, the initial hypothesis was that paid military service, 
as currently applied, includes a form of economic discrimination. That is, paid exemptions 
can be inequitable if the exemption fee is relatively steep for a particular segment of the 
eligible population. At the same time, a high cutoff age for eligibility may tend to favor 
men who postponed their military service because they could afford to do so by pursuing 
higher education. A lower cutoff age and increased affordability by a larger portion of the 
draft-eligible pool would help to remove such inequities in exemption acts. Further, paid 
exemption acts tend to have high public approval and are considered legitimate, since there 
is no significant opposition to these acts. Lastly, the impact of paid exemptions on the 
effectiveness on the TAF could be negative, based on their eligibility requirements, or 
neutral, if the number of paid exemption beneficiaries is low. 
1. Should the Turkish Government Offer the Option to Pay a Certain 
Fee to Be Exempt from Compulsory Military Service? 
Some might argue that allowing some citizens the opportunity to buy their way out 
of military service, defined as a patriotic duty and responsibility of all qualified men under 
a universal draft, is fundamentally wrong. Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter V, high 
participation rates by eligible men in the 2018 program (see Chapter III, Table 10), along 
with other factors, indicate a general public acceptance of paid military service. Aside from 
such apparent legitimacy, the present study has identified several potential problems with 
paid military service in Turkey. 
One such problem relates to the proportional distribution of various demographic 
groups in the TAF. For example, with a large Kurdish population residing mostly in the 
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eastern or southeastern parts of Turkey, and considering the long-lasting fight with the 
Kurdish Terrorist Group-PKK, unintended consequences may result from paid military 
service with a relatively low exemption fee. Taking into account the age distribution of 
PKK militants (see Figure 4), candidate draft evaders can easily buy their out of military 
service, possibly affecting Kurdish population representation in the TAF. 
Additionally, the overall quality of the TAF enlisted force will likely suffer in some 
way by the loss of men with increased education who deferred their compulsory military 
service. Young men who pursued higher education likely have relatively advanced 
academic skills, many in areas of critical importance to the TAF, along with strong 
intellectual, analytical, and problem-solving abilities, as well as personal characteristics 
and life experiences that tend to enhance one’s leadership potential. Further, as discussed 
above, paid military service can create a situation where socially or economically 
disadvantaged young men serve and fight in place of their more-advantaged peers who 
postponed their service to meet the age limit and can afford to pay the exemption fee.  
Another important issue relates specifically to the use of age limitations in 
determining eligibility. All of the six previous exemption laws were temporary and 
designed to meet pressing objectives of the time. The first law in 1987 had a cutoff age of 
40; one law had a cutoff age of 29; three more set the cutoff age at 27; and the most recent 
law had the lowest cutoff age at 25 (see Chapter 3, Table 10). Although each of these laws 
is distinctive in its own way, all share the feature of providing the buyout opportunity to 
men who are at least in their mid-twenties.  Certainly, this provision of the law is based on 
a well-conceived plan to meet a practical objective and national security needs can likely 
explain using a specific cutoff age. On the other hand, how could these older cutoff ages 
be explained to a draft-eligible man who would like to participate but is too young to 
qualify for the buyout opportunity, which is offered only temporarily and may or may not 
be provided again in three, four, or more years? The temporary and indeterminate use of 
the exemption law makes it difficult for draft-eligible men to plan their educational goals 
or careers, and particularly so for those who would prefer to postpone their military 
obligation or pay an exemption fee and serve their country in another way. Moreover, those 
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who do not qualify because of their younger age may well ask if the age limitation violates 
the principle of “equality before the law.”  
One possible, yet unexplored, outcome of targeting older men consistently in the 
six exemption programs is the way in which it could influence future behavior. For 
example, by rewarding draft-liable men who have postponed meeting their obligation, 
other, younger men may be encouraged to behave similarly. The message, especially in 
2018, is clear: defer your service, if you can, and you will be rewarded with the opportunity 
to buy out of your obligation for only $2,700. For better or worse, the impact of such 
behavior on the TAF and the nation as a whole is unknown.     
In conclusion, in terms of military effectiveness, paid military service exemption 
laws as currently designed may decrease the overall quality of men conscripted through 
Turkey’s universal draft.  Even though the exemption laws are politically legitimate and 
enjoy public approval, they may have unanticipated, adverse consequences in the 
continuing fight against the Kurdish Terrorist Group-PKK.  Further, the exemption laws 
do not meet social equity criteria since they tend to discriminate based on socioeconomic 
status as well as age-related requirements.  
Therefore, one could argue that paid military service—as applied in the six previous 
cases—is unfair to some segments of the draft-eligible pool and may adversely affect 
military effectiveness. Although exemption laws are generally accepted by the public and 
various ruling governments, one could argue that they create “loopholes” in Turkey’s 
system of universal military service and do not adhere strictly to the guiding principles of 
equality. If there is an excess of candidates in the eligible draftee population or an urgent 
need for revenue that necessitates using paid military service, the exemption laws can be 
revised to minimize unintended, adverse consequences. Additionally, paid military service 
could be instituted permanently, perhaps at scheduled, periodic intervals, and redesigned 
to uphold the principle of the “equality before the law.” 
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2. Is Paid Military Service an Effective Method for Staffing the Turkish 
Military and Meeting the Nation’s Defense Needs?  
A universal draft is basically inefficient, as discussed in Chapter V. The temporary 
paid military service exemption laws do not address the inefficiency problem in the TAF 
and can adversely affect the quality of draftees. One of the main criticisms of the current 
universal draft is its limited screening of draftees, who enter with various levels of 
motivation, aptitude, and general ability, from high to low, desirable and less desirable. 
With paid military service policies, high-quality enlistees tend to remove themselves from 
the draftee pool. Men who met the eligibility requirements for paid exemption were the 
potential draftees with higher education. In 2018, over 730,000 men took advantage of the 
buyout opportunity. As a result, the TAF likely lost a significant number of higher-educated 
people who would have served in the coming years, thus increasing proportionately the 
presence of draftees with lower educational attainment. Given that the total number of 
draftees constitutes more than 60 percent of the TAF's total end strength (see Chapter II, 
Table 8), the magnitude of this effect may be significant if paid exemptions are introduced 
more frequently and with relatively high cut-off ages.  
As discussed previously, the most recent paid military exemption law of 2018 had 
a minimum cutoff age of 25, which was the youngest eligibility requirement of the six laws 
enacted since 1987 (see Chapter III, Table 10). This means that a sizable number of Turkish 
men between the ages of 20 and 25 are still currently liable to serve, without the option of 
buying their way out of the draft. In this sense, even though many thousands of draftees 
took advantage of the paid military buyout in 2018, the TAF will not be affected that much 
in terms of draftee numbers in the near future.  
Even though the quantity of required draftees will not suffer that much due to the 
cut-off age, the most recent paid military service law may have an adverse impact on the 
quality of draftees. Therefore, in the recent security environment, with increasing 
uncertainty and asymmetric threats that call for skilled and high-quality military 
manpower, paid military service may fail to support staffing requirements in the Turkish 
military and, more generally, the nation’s defense needs. 
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3. Is Paid Military Service Fair? 
As discussed above, the various Turkish paid military service exemption acts 
include inequities. Clearly, if the exemption fee were comparatively high, as it was in the 
2011 act with a fee of $16,000 (see Chapter III, Table 10), proportionately fewer age-
eligible men would be able to afford paying it. Men who are highly motivated, yet 
financially disadvantaged, might be able to pay the fee, but with greater difficulty than their 
more advantaged peers. (Recall, the minimum age limit in 2011 was 29. Just fewer than 70 
thousand men participated.) It is easy to see how the required fee in 2011—nearly six-times 
higher than the fee in 2018—could be said to favor more socioeconomically advantaged 
men, those who are single with fewer dependents, or those who have less accumulated 
financial debt. The 2011 act was applied on a rather small scale, yet it raised over $1 billion 
(U.S. dollars) in revenue.  Consequently, the overall impact of this particular exemption 
program on staffing the TAF was minimal. If it had been applied on a larger scale, say, by 
lowering the cutoff age, the obvious inequity of a high fee would leave some disadvantaged 
men disgruntled, as they watched their more affluent peers buy out of the draft, wondering 
if Turkey’s universal military service had become mostly a “poor man’s duty.”  
As previously observed, the six temporary exemption laws (see Chapter III, Table 
10) have restricted eligibility to men from the age of at least 40 (in the 1987 law), at least 
29 (2011), at least 27 (1992, 1999, and 2014), to at least 25 (2018). Since these laws 
distinguish between citizens using the year in which they are born, one could say they 
introduce a form of “age discrimination.” The key to countering such a claim would be 
some strong justification for the age limits, such as evidence demonstrating that younger 
men tend to perform better than their older counterparts as draftees in the TAF. This could 
then be called a way of assisting the needs of national security, although it would be 
difficult to defend such a claim as long as a man’s legal obligation under the universal draft 
extended until the age of 41. At the same time, it should be noted that some age cohorts of 
Turkish men never had the option of paid military service due to fact that an exemption act 
was not initiated during their years of age-eligibility for the draft.  In other instances, some 
men may have somehow missed the window of opportunity because of the law’s age 
restrictions and the uncertainty of postponing their obligated service. Since the temporary 
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exemption laws have thus far been introduced only on an “as needed” basis, some age 
cohorts of men have been fortunate to have the option of a buyout while others have not.  
Age limitations in the exemption laws can also be associated with socioeconomic 
favoritism. As noted, in the most recent law of 2018, eligibility opportunities favored men 
who had postponed their military obligation by pursuing higher education or training. 
Although the low exemption fee in 2018 was widely affordable for prospective 
participants, a young man’s ability to postpone his military obligation until the age of 25 
or older suggests that these men are among a more economically or socially advantaged 
segment of the population than many younger men. In other words, since the exemption 
laws tend to favor those who have postponed their obligation, they also favor those who 
have had the means and opportunities to postpone that obligation.  
One of the initial hypotheses of the study was that the financial affordability of 
participating in the exemption programs, based primarily on the associated fees, would be 
a beacon to mark their fairness. Nevertheless, it turns out that the relatively high cut-off 
ages of the exemption acts harbor a significant cause of inequity, even in the relatively 
affordable program of 2018.  
4. Does Paid Military Service follow the Established Principles of 
Turkey’s Constitutional Government, and Does it Have Popular 
Approval? 
As discussed in Chapter II, Article 72 of the Constitution (1982) states that the 
manner in which national service will be performed is up to the legislature, and buying out 
of military service can be lawfully deemed as fulfilling this citizenship right and duty. Even 
though the prevalent course of action is that every male Turkish citizen is subject to serve 
in accordance with the Recruitment Act (1927), paid military service exemption acts are in 
compliance with Article 72 of the Constitution.  
As previously observed, paid military service laws have enjoyed high public 
approval. Further, over the years, an increasing number of draft-eligible men have opted 
for the paid exemption. One could argue that high public approval of the exemption acts 
and the increasing participation rates are a sign of eroding legitimacy of the current 
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compulsory military service policy. The so-called positive reinforcements of military 
service discussed in Chapter IV may be declining due to the individualist, economically 
rational, and utility-maximization type of thinking that has become increasingly appealing 
among the draft-eligible population. As a result, military service at the age of 20 is not 
necessarily the presumed male “rite of passage” in Turkish society that it once was. This 
could be especially true for young men from families with higher socioeconomic status, 
who still see the draft as a legitimate patriotic responsibility but also as an obstacle or 
detour on the road to their future educational plans and career. 
The age limitations and temporary nature of the exemption laws make paid military 
service a state-based privilege provided to some Turkish men but not to others. As observed 
above in the discussion of fairness, previous applications of the exemption laws do not 
adhere strictly to Article 10 of the Turkish Constitution (1982), which establishes the 
principle of “equality before the law.” Essentially, this may raise questions concerning the 
legitimacy of previous paid exemption laws on a constitutional level, not just on the level 
of whether they enjoy popular, political, or governmental approval.  Indeed, one can 
evaluate the legitimacy of paid exemption laws from two different perspectives based on 
two different articles of the Constitution. Although the constitutional issues are not raised 
during daily political discourse, and paid military service shares approval by many Turkish 
citizens and political elites, the exemption laws that have been enacted in the past would 
be an interesting topic of discussion for the nation’s legal scholars. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
For over 30 years, Turkey has struggled with a threat caused by the Kurdish 
Separatist Group in the southeastern part of the nation. It should be noted that 
approximately 20 percent of Turkey’s population is Kurdish. One potential consequence 
of the temporary exemption laws is underrepresentation of the Kurdish people in the TAF, 
which may ultimately lead to an increased likelihood for military adventurism not approved 
by all segments of Turkish society. Information on the ethnicities of men who bought out 
of their compulsory military service was publicly unreported and unavailable for the 
present research. Further study could focus on the effects of paid military service on 
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population representation in the TAF, particularly that of the Kurdish segment of the 
society. 
In general, the previous exemption laws have provided a positive advantage to 
relatively older and more educated men in the draft-eligible pool. The 2018 exemption law, 
which created the biggest gap in the draftee corps, merits further analysis in the coming 
years. The present research suggests that the most recent exemption law could have an 
adverse impact on the overall quality of draftees in the TAF. A comprehensive analysis 
should be initiated to assess the long-term consequences of the exemption laws on military 
effectiveness. As discussed previously, the loss of older, more highly educated draftees 
with highly valued critical-thinking skills and life experiences could have a significantly 
negative effect on the TAF. The scope of the present study was limited due to a lack of 
confidential data. For such a comprehensive analysis, researchers would probably benefit 
from surveys or confidential field studies. Further, since paid exemption laws are still 
temporary and are unpredictable in terms of both their timing and eligibility requirements, 
the analysis could use various hypothetical factors to predict participation by draft-eligible 
men under several possible scenarios. The demographic characteristics of likely 
participants could also be estimated, which would better inform policy makers in 
establishing eligibility requirements and exemption fees to minimize any adverse or 
unintended consequences on the TAF.   
High participation in the 2018 offering of paid military service was undoubtedly 
related to the low exemption fee, which was roughly one-third the amount required in 2014 
and one-sixth of what was required in 2011. At the same time, high participation could be 
an indicator that public approval of the universal draft is eroding. Even though paid military 
service may not be the most effective way to meet the nation’s defense needs, it has been 
used three times in the past eight years. Clearly, any future research on paid military service 
should include an econometric analysis to identify the optimal exemption fee and cut-off 
age needed to recover the budgetary costs of draftees in a given fiscal year. 
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